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Introduction
The history of the Indonesian occupation of the former Portuguese colony 
(1975-99) has yet to be written. While its legacy continues to be played out in present- 
day political struggles between the older and younger generations, particularly over the 
question of which language to adopt,2 we possess little understanding of the ways in 
which the East Timorese interacted with the Indonesians during those terrible years. 
Despite the wealth of secondhand accounts of the occupation period, a vital ingredient
11 wish to record my thanks here to the Leverhulme Foundation (London), the Southeast Committee of the 
British Academy (London), and the Oppenheimer Fund of Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, for their 
generous support for the research on which this study is based. I would also like to thank Cristina Cruz 
and Carlos Guerreiro of the former Commissao para os Direitos do Povo Maubere (Commission for the 
Rights of the Maubere [Timorese] People) for their help in setting up all the interviews with the East 
Timorese exile community in Lisbon in 1999-2000.
2 See note 43 below.
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has been missing—the voices of the East Timorese people themselves. Apart from the 
testimonies collected by the late Michele Turner,3 the remarkable autobiographical 
memoir of the clandestine resistance leader, Constancio Pinto,4 and the brief account of 
the young student activist (and present-day chief-of-staff of the East Timor Defense 
Force), Donaciano Gomes,5 6the personal witnesses of this younger or "new" generation 
(geragao fou n f  who had their schooling and grew to maturity during the Indonesian 
occupation period (1975-99) have not been heard.7 This is all the more remarkable 
when we consider that many of these young men and women subsequently became 
involved in the clandestine and armed resistance movement (i.e., the Forgas Armadas 
de Libertacao Nacional de Timor-Leste, Falintil) and are now destined, like 
Donaciano, to make their mark as future leaders of the newly independent Republic. 
Others, who were never active participants in the resistance movements, nonetheless 
experienced the pain and tragedy of these years and have their own stories to tell of 
the often ambivalent relationship with the Indonesians.
In 1999, just as their homeland was passing through the final agony of the TNI- 
inspired (TNI, Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Army) militia killings, 
the August 30 independence referendum, and the final Indonesian withdrawal, I had 
the opportunity to interview some twenty-three East Timorese exiles in Portugal and 
the UK with a colleague, Dr. Viet Nguyen-Gillham, who had worked with female 
victims of violence in the former Yugoslavia.8 For the purposes of the present study, 
only fourteen of these twenty-three are quoted, and three of these, the late liurai
3 Michele Turner, Telling: East Timor, Personal Testimonies, 1942-1992 (Kensington: New South Wales 
University Press, 1992). These testimonies deal mainly with the Japanese Occupation (1942^5), the trauma 
of the Indonesian invasion of December 1975, and that of its immediate aftermath.
4 See Constancio Pinto and Matthew Jar dine, East Timor's Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese 
Resistance, A Testimony (Boston: South End Press, 1996).
5 See Donaciano Gomes, "The East Timor Intifada: Testimony of a Student Activist," in East Timor at the 
Crossroads, ed. Peter Carey and G. Carter Bentley (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press/Social Science 
Research Council, 1995), pp. 106-8. East Timor Defense Force: Falintil-Forgas de Defesa de Timor-Leste, F- 
FDTL.
6 This term is now used to denote the Indonesian-educated younger generation who were not part of the 
1975 leadership generation and did not share their factionalism and party conflicts rooted in the August 
1975 civil war. Their different intellectual formation under the Indonesian regime and their use of Bahasa 
rather than Portuguese are also distinguishing features; see further Fernando de Araujo, "The CNRT 
Campaign for Independence," in Out of the Ashes: Deconstruction and Reconstruction o f East Timor, ed. James 
J. Fox and Dionfsio Babo Soares (Adelaide: Crawford House, 2000), p. 108, n. 1.
7 The late Michele Turner interviewed some of these members of the younger generation for her moving 
collection, Telling, and I used some of these for the historical introduction in Steve Cox and Peter Carey, 
Generations o f Resistance: East Timor (London: Cassell, 1995). But Turner restricted herself to the East 
Timorese exile community in Australia, many of whom had been out of East Timor for several years, and she 
had no access to the cohort of young East Timorese activists (including the three Falintil members we 
interviewed) who eventually made their way to Portugal— often by jumping over the fences of foreign 
embassies in Jakarta, or through the good offices of the International Committee of the Red Cross — in the 
mid 1990s.
8 Dr. Viet Nguyen-Gillham had had particular experience of working with Croat and Bosnian Muslim 
women in Bihac, Mostar, and other so-called UN-protected "safe havens" in the former Yugoslavia in 
1994-97 at the end of the civil war (1991-95), and in the post-Dayton Accord era. I would hereby like to 
record my gratitude to her, particularly for the help she gave me with the interviews conducted with East 
Timorese women.
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(customary chief) of Atsabe, Guilherme Gonsalves, the young daughter of a former 
colonial civil servant, Ana Maria Vitor, the even younger and distinctly apolitical 
Delfina Maria de Jesus de Rego Soriano, and the former member of the Popular 
Organization of Timorese Women (Organizacao Popular de Mulher de Timor, OPMT), 
Bernardina Fernandes Alves (nom-de-guerre "Ohar") are cited only in one or two 
passages. Others, such as the two Dili-based members of the student underground, 
Martinho Maia Gonsalves and Domingos Matos, together with the Lospalos-born 
Ejfdio Dias Quintas, are given much more space. Why? Principally because these 
young men (and unfortunately the men very much outnumbered the women in the 
"new" generation exile community in Portugal) were distinguished by their links with 
the resistance movement. Indeed, if there is a central theme to the present survey, it is 
that of the political awakening of these young men under the pressures of the 
occupation.
Delfina Maria de Jesus de Rego Soriano (bom Dili, 1976). Lisbon, November 1999. 
Copyright © The Leverhulme Trust (London) "Survivors Project."
This is the story then of a generation's coming of age, a generation schooled by the 
Indonesians, but one that—while members were still in their teens—began to reassess 
their future and move towards a rejection of what Jakarta had to offer. In so doing, 
they developed their own methods for opposing Jakarta's colonialism, thereby 
destroying Indonesian hopes that they might accept their enforced membership of the 
unitary Republic and abandon once and for all their parents' dream of an independent
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East Timor. In concentrating on these pro-independence youngsters, there is an 
inevitable foreshortening of the frame of what was happening in East Timor during 
these years. A fuller picture might include less "heroic" members of the occupation 
generation: Timorese orphans brought up by Indonesian officers, many of whom are 
now more familiar with inner-island Indonesia than distant Timor; Timorese women 
who married (more or less voluntarily) Indonesian men and brought up families in 
Timor and Indonesia and consider themselves both Indonesian and Timorese; activists 
on the political left who were driven more by communist political ideology than 
Timorese nationalism; convinced Catholics (including ordained priests and religious) 
for whom all forms of violence were abhorrent and who tried to tread a middle way 
between the resistance and the Indonesian occupiers; and collaborators who were 
convinced that the future lay in union with Indonesia rather than the establishment of a 
politically and economically problematic micro-state. A more rounded study of the 
occupation must eventually bring these very different participants in the Indonesian era 
into the frame, for they were just as representative of these occupation years as the 
pro-resistance activists who dominate the present account. The work of East Timor's 
Truth, Reception, and Reconciliation Commission may help here in allowing these very 
different voices to be heard and making available a rich collection of primary interview 
material for future historians.9
Those East Timorese living in exile in Lisbon and other European cities in the late 
1990s were a privileged group: most had had access to higher education. Indeed, nearly 
all had graduated from senior high school during the Indonesian-occupation period, 
and many had either benefited from tertiary education in universities and technical 
colleges in inner-island Indonesia or had enrolled in courses in their places of exile. This 
immediately set them apart from over 99 percent of their fellow countrymen and 
women who had enjoyed no such opportunities. Apart from the late liurai of Atsabe 
and the second Indonesian-appointed Governor of East Timor, Guilherme Gonsalves 
(1919-99, in office 1978-82), whose presence in Lisbon was fortuitous,10 all those we 
interviewed had arrived in Portugal between 1990 and 1998. Most had come through
9 The Commission was established by the East Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA) cabinet in 
December 2000 and endorsed by the National Council of East Timor on April 25,2001. It has two principal 
functions: (1) seeking truth about the pattern and scope of human rights violations in the past (i.e., for the 
whole occupation era [1975-99] and the August 1975 civil war and its aftermath when many UDT (Uniao 
Democratica Timorense, Timorese Democratic Union) and Fretilin supporters died at each other's hands, 
including some four hundred UDT prisoners who were murdered by Fretilin after the Indonesian invasion 
in December 1975); and (2) facilitating community acceptance of those who committed lesser crimes. Serious 
crimes are currently being left for prosecution by the Serious Crimes Investigation Unit established by the 
UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in 2000-2002; see William Schabas, 
"Prosecuting Atrocities: Contributing to Democratic Transitions," in Nationbuilding in East Timor, ed.
Crag a Almeida Rodrigues and Heather Wharton (Clementsport, Nova Scotia: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 
2002), p. 128. The present Commission team contains many leading Indonesia and East Timor specialists 
(Gerry and Helene van Klinken, Patrick Burgess, Galuh Wandita, Akihisa Matsuno, Kieran Dwyer, Susana 
Barnes, Douglas Kammen, and Geoffrey Gunn) working under the direction of Pat Walsh, erstwhile 
Director of the Human Rights Office of the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) and Coordinator 
of the East Timor Talks Campaign, and is likely to lead to a significant corpus of interview material that 
may soon be available to scholars to reconstruct the history of East Timor during these terrible years.
10 Guilherme Gonsalves had come to Europe to participate in the fourth All-Inclusive East Timorese 
Dialogue at Schloss Krumbach in Austria in November 1998 and been forced to seek medical help in Lisbon 
after being taken gravely ill; he later died there in October 1999.
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the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the majority after entering foreign 
embassies in Jakarta. Only two (both women) had made their way to Portugal by 
private means. One of these, Delfina Maria de Jesus de Rego Soriano (born Dili, 1976), 
was helped out by an uncle who had reached Lisbon under ICRC auspices and 
arranged for her passport and travel documents to be bought for her in East Timor. 
Apart from Gonsalves (b. 1919), all were born between 1950 and 1978, with by far the 
greatest number (16 out of 23) having birthdays in the decade 1968-78. This meant 
that the 1968-78 cohort were at most seven years old, or in Class 2 of primary school, 
when the December 7, 1975 Indonesian invasion took place. The majority of their 
schooling was thus destined to take place under the occupation.
A sizeable number (6 out of 23) were Fataluku from the extreme eastern or Ponta 
Leste (Eastern Point) region of the territory. Constituting some 3 percent of Timor's 
800,000 ethnic Timorese inhabitants, this notoriously independent-minded ethnic 
group had provided the backbone of the armed resistance to the Indonesians after the 
fall of the Mt. Matebian redoubt in November-December 1978. Another important 
cohort (9 out of 23) had been born and brought up in East Timor's capital Dfli with 
parents who hailed from the country's more westerly ethnic communities (i.e., Mambai, 
Galole, Belu, Bunaq, and Kemak). Only two were of Chinese-Timorese descent. None 
hailed from the capital's tiny Arab community at Kampong Alor (home of the present 
prime minister, Mari Alkatiri) and only a few (Gonsalves was a notable exception here) 
had any significant pre-1975 contact or blood relationship with the Portuguese. 
Leaving aside instruction at the hands of Catholic priests and lay brothers, whose 
quality was universally praised, the handful who had contact with their Portuguese 
colonial masters were generally less than impressed with their racial attitudes, one even 
going so far as to describe them as "arrogant" and "unwilling to mix with the local 
Timorese population." (Interview with Antonio Campos, former Falintil commander, 
Lisbon, April 15, 2000)
In the following paper, I will explore several aspects of the East Timorese- 
Indonesian relationship in the period immediately before and during the twenty-four- 
year occupation. These include East Timorese perceptions (or more accurately 
misperceptions) of their vast neighbor during the late Portuguese colonial era and the 
variety of East Timorese-Indonesian contacts during the occupation itself. I have 
divided the discussion of the latter into four sections: (i) contacts with the Indonesian 
military, and the distinctions that the East Timorese themselves made between the 
various Indonesian army elite units and territorial battalions; (ii) the nature of the 
relationships that developed on the school benches of the newly established Indonesian 
primary schools (Sekolah Dasar, SD), junior high schools (Sekolah Menengah Pertama, 
SMP), and senior high schools (Sekolah Menengah Atas, SMA); (iii) the key incidents 
or "turning points" which caused many of the young East Timorese I interviewed to 
"wake up" to the realities of the regime under which they were being forced to live; and 
(iv) the ways in which the East Timorese learned to live alongside the Indonesians 
while intensifying their clandestine resistance. The latter was a form of "sleeping with 
the enemy" by no means unique to East Timor (for example, in Nazi-occupied France, 
1940-44, it was both literally and figuratively true), but which the East Timorese 
seemed to have developed into a fine art. I draw these together in a brief conclusion 
before adding a postscript, which considers the current inter-generational conflict 
between the Portuguese-educated (pre-1975) and the Indonesian-educated cohorts,
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looking especially at the issue of the adoption of Portuguese as the official language of 
East Timor. This study represents research in progress, and the interviews conducted 
so far are merely the first part of a much larger project on East Timorese oral histories 
of the occupation that I intend to write during the coming year (2003-4) on the basis of 
more extensive research amongst non-elite Timorese in Timor itself.
In terms of periodization, it may be useful for those unfamiliar with the recent 
history of East Timor to see the Indonesian occupation in three phases: (1) the initial 
years of conquest between 1975-79, when most of the conservatively estimated 
150,000 deaths (out of a total pre-1975 population of 700,000) occurred;11 (2) the 
middle period of the partial "consolidation" of the occupation regime during the next 
decade (1979-89) that lasted until the "opening" of East Timor by the Suharto regime 
in January 1989; and (3) the final decade (1989-99), which witnessed the rapid 
unraveling of Jakarta's authority as the situation in East Timor became 
internationalized through events such as the November 12, 1991 Santa Cruz massacre 
and the October 11, 1996 Nobel Peace Prize award to Bishop Belo and Jos6 Ramos 
Horta. At the end of this decade, the collapse of the Suharto regime (May 21, 1998) 
and President B. J. Habibie's (in office, 1998-99) impetuous January 27, 1999 promise 
to give East Timor either autonomy or independence hugely accelerated events in East 
Timor, leading directly to the deployment of a UN Assistance Mission (UNAMET) to 
prepare for the August 30,1999 independence vote.
1. Through a Glass Darkly: East Timorese Perceptions of Indonesia in the 
Immediate Pre- and Post-Invasion Period
It was said that if one wished to post a letter to Jakarta from Dili in the late 
Portuguese colonial era, the missive had to go all the way to Lisbon first before it could 
be delivered to the Indonesian capital. Almost certainly apocryphal, this tale points to 
an important truth—namely, the almost complete isolation in which East Timor was 
kept by the Portuguese right up to the end of their occupation. The political situation in 
Portugal itself contributed directly to this state of affairs: the fall of the monarchy and 
proclamation of the Republic in October 1910 opened a turbulent period in Portuguese
11 A debate has developed between scholars regarding the number of deaths during the occupation, 
especially during the first five years (1975-80), when the bulk of the deaths occurred. An early evaluation 
of the available population statistics by Gabriel Defert (pseudonym for a French Foreign Ministry official 
and specialist on Indonesia who defended his doctoral thesis on East Timor at the University of Paris in 
1988-89), deriving from the Catholic Church and the Portuguese colonial and Indonesian governments, 
suggested a conservative death toll of between 170,000 and 212,000, based on the pre-1975 population of 
700,000 and the partial Indonesian government census of 567,000 in 1981. The difference in estimates arose 
from different calculations of the annual population increase in the period 1975-81, from a low of 1.1 
percent to a high of 2.2 percent; see Gabriel Defert, Timor Est. Le Genocide Oublie: Droit d'un people et 
raisons d’Etats (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1992), pp. 147-51. A much lower figure of fifty thousand 
deaths in the 1975-80 period has been advanced by Robert Cribb in his "How Many Deaths? Problems in 
the statistics of massacre in Indonesia (1965-66) and East Timor (1975-1980)," in Violence in Indonesia, ed. 
Ingrid Wessel and Georgia Wimhoefer (Hamburg: Abera Verlag, 2001), pp. 82-96. This figure has recently 
been rejected by Ben Kiernan, who has concluded that a toll of "150,000 is likely close to the truth. If we 
include victims of post-1980 massacres and of the 1981-82 famine, the figure is substantially higher." See 
Ben Kiernan, "The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia: The Death Tolls in Cambodia, 1975-79, and 
East Timor, 1975-1980," Critical Asian Studies 35,4 (December 2003).
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politics brought to an end only by the establishment of Dr. Antonio de Oliveira 
Salazar's clerico-fascist "Estado Novo" (New State) (1930-68). Deeply suspicious of 
the Protestant powers, especially the Dutch in the neighboring Netherlands East Indies, 
who were thought to harbor pro-German sentiments during World War I, and fearful 
that the pitiful Portuguese military would be no match for potential predators like the 
Japanese, successive Portuguese governments strove to keep their distant Southeast 
Asian colony isolated and inconspicuous to prevent it from falling under the control of 
foreign powers. This was particularly the case under the Salazarist dictatorship, when 
Timor gained notoriety as a tropical "Siberia," a place of exile for political opponents 
who were banished as deportados (those deported) to the furthest reaches of the 
Ultramar (overseas empire).12 Even these precautions failed to prevent Allied incursions 
at the outbreak of the Pacific War and a full-scale Japanese invasion in February 1942. 
When in December 1961 Salazar lost Goa to Nehru's India, the aging dictator became 
increasingly paranoiac. He made strenuous efforts to hang on to Portugal's African 
possessions, dedicating 40 percent of the Portuguese national budget to the military 
costs of colonial defense. But by the time ill-health forced him from office in June 1968, 
three costly colonial wars in Africa had all but consumed his empire. In fact, the 
colonial degringolade (collapse) changed the face of modern Portugal, preparing the 
ground for the Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Forgas Armadas) coup-de- 
main of April 25, 1974—the virtually bloodless "Carnation Revolution"—which set 
Western Europe's most underdeveloped state on the road to democracy13 and eventual 
membership in the European Community (post-1993, European Union) in 1985.14
It is thus no surprise that isolation and backwardness were the features most 
remarked on by Western travelers to Portuguese Timor. For observers from the British 
naturalist Alfred Russel Wallace in the early 1860s, through Joseph Conrad, who 
described Dili in his classic novel, Victory: An Island Tale, in 1915, to the Australian 
consul Jim Dunn exactly half a century later, the epithets "miserable," "poor," 
"pestilential" and "quaint and incongruous" were what sprung to mind when
12 Leading sons of deportados who assumed leadership roles after 1974-5 were Mario and Manuel 
Carrascalao, and Jose Ramos Horta, whose fathers had been exiled for anti-Salazarist activities in the 
1930s. In Horta's case, his father, a full-blood Portuguese and son of an anarcho-syndicalist, who had 
himself ended up as an exile in East Timor (1927-42), had participated as a naval gunner in a mutiny 
involving two frigates of the Salazarist marine that had attempted to put to sea from Lisbon and sail to 
Spain to join the Republican side at the start of the Spanish civil war (1936-39). The mutineers were 
intercepted by pro-Salazarist vessels at the mouth of the Tagus river, the crews arrested, and most later 
banished to Portugal's African colonies and East Timor. See further Jose Ramos-Horta, Funu: The 
Unfinished Saga of East Timor (Trenton, NJ: North Sea Press, 1987), pp. 7-8; and Lufs Cardoso, The 
Crossing: A Story of East Timor (London: Granta Publications, 2000), pp. 98-99.
13 Between 1974 and 1976, Portugal had two presidents, six provisional governments, and two coup 
attempts. Even after the transition to democracy with the elections of Mario Soares and his Socialist Party 
(Partido Socialista, PS), and that of Ramalho Eanes (1976-86) to the presidency in 1976, the process of 
political consolidation proved turbulent. Between 1976 and 1982, Portugal had eight constitutional 
governments (more than one a year). The economic and domestic situation began to stabilize only between 
1982 and 1986 during the long incumbency of Soares's PS-PSD (Partido Social Democrata, Social Democrat 
Party) coalition (1983-85), which oversaw the entrance of Portugal into the European Community (EC).
14 Portugal became a member of the European Community on January 1,1986 at the same time as Spain and 
Greece.
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contemplating this most remote outpost of the Lusitanian empire.15 How different this 
was from the situation in the pre-Iberian and pre-formal colonial periods from the 
sixteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries, when, in addition to the perennial Chinese 
and Hadhrami Arabs, Javanese, Bugis, Makasarese, and Butonese merchants had 
frequented the island, which was famed for its supplies of sandalwood, for 
commercial purposes. In this period, the seat of the first Portuguese governor in Lifau 
(later the Portuguese enclave of Oecussi-Ambeno in the Netherlands-East Indies 
Residency of Timor) had been popularly known as the "Makasar Shore" (Pante 
Makasar), so ubiquitous were the local Bugis and Makasarese trading there; and no 
colonially inspired frontiers separated Portuguese Timor (Timor Leste) from the rest of 
what is now the eastern Indonesian province of Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT), which 
includes West Timor, Flores, Pantar, Alor, and other neighboring islands.16
It seems clear that the Portuguese colonial administration in the post-war era 
permitted very little information about developments in their vast neighbor to 
penetrate the closed world of late-Lusitanian East Timor. Thus the dramatic events of 
the late 1940s, when the young Indonesian Republic fought and won its independence 
from the Dutch (1945-49), had limited impact in the colony. While many interviewees 
born in the Portuguese period knew about the first Indonesian President, Sukarno (in 
office, 1945-67) and his championing of Third World issues, the turbulent years of his 
"Guided Democracy" (1959-65) regime were only fitfully understood. Even the PRRI- 
Permesta (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, Revolutionary Government of 
the Republic of Indonesia; Perjuangan Semesta Alam, Inclusive Struggle) revolts in the 
outer islands (West Sumatra, North Sulawesi) in 1957-61, which had direct 
repercussions in East Timor when some Permesta members sought refuge in the colony 
and played a role in inciting an anti-Portuguese revolt in the district of Uatolari in June 
1959 (a revolt which then spread to Viqueque and Ossu), were known only to those 
who lived in the immediate environs.17 As for the mid-1960s and the bloody repression
15 See Alfred Russel Wallace, The Malay Archipelago: The Land o f the Orang-Utan and the Bird o f Paradise,
A Narrative o f Travel with Studies o f Man and Nature (New York: Dover Publications, 1962), pp. 144-5, 
where Wallace speaks of Dili as a "most miserable place compared with even the poorest of the Dutch 
[East-Indies] towns." Joseph Conrad, in Victory: An Island Tale, Everyman edition (London: J. M. Dent & 
Sons, 1994), p. 12, referred to Dili as "that highly pestilential place," and James Dunn, in Timor: A People 
Betrayed (Sydney: ABC Books, 1996), p. 1, remarked on the "quaint and incongruous" situation in which 
the colony existed during Jus posting in the mid-1960s.
16 On the making of this frontier between the Dutch and the Portuguese and the various transfers of territory 
in the period 1847-1916, see Ren6 Pelissier, Timor en Guerre: Le Crocodile et les Portugais (1847-1913) 
(Orgeval: Pelissier, 1996), pp. 27-28, 33-39,180-85, 208-9, 238-9, 301-2; and Geoffrey C. Gunn, Timor 
Loro Sae: 500 Years (Macau: Livros do Oriente, 1999), pp. 141-58, who relies heavily on Pelissier for his 
discussion of the frontier negotiations and land transfers finalized in 1916.
17 The Makassae second-line Portuguese colonial army (tropas) soldier, Moises do Amaral (b. 1950), who 
grew up in Uatolari in the 1950s, was one of the those who experienced the bloody aftermath of this 
abortive revolt at first hand. He explained:
After the outbreak of the Outer Island rebellions in Indonesia [1957-61], a group of remnants of the 
Permesta rebellion in North Sulawesi, whom I thought then were members of the Indonesian Communist 
Party [Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI], came to Viqueque as political exiles. They then mounted a revolt 
against the Portuguese colonial regime by asking local people to join them to get their independence. My own 
sub-district [posto] of Uatolari and my small hamlet near Uatolari township were involved. The Portuguese 
brought in large numbers of Angolanese and Portuguese troops to crush the revolt, and during this campaign, 
they burned my father's carpentry store and his house. They killed the goats and pigs, forcing my family to
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which brought General Suharto and his New Order (1966-98) to power following the 
army's crushing of the so-called GESTAPU (Gerakan September Tiga-Puluh, September 
30 Movement) and the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), these 
fateful events had only a distant resonance in East Timor. Indeed, the Portuguese 
colonial officials appear to have ensured that this was the case by exercising tight 
control over news coming into the colony and access across the border to Indonesia.
While most of those interviewed who had been born in the Portuguese era knew the 
names of the Indonesian presidents and admitted to a passing knowledge of the 
existence of Suharto's New Order, few had been across the border into West Timor, 
and, even if they had, their impressions of the Indonesia of the late 1960s and early 
1970s were scarcely favorable. "Very poor, very disorganized, and really quite brutal" 
was the judgment of one East Timorese member of the second-line section of the 
Portuguese colonial army (tropas), who knew from his fellow army colleagues on the 
frontier about the Indonesians who came in from Atambua and other places in West 
Timor looking for food and economic opportunities in the richer eastern part of the 
island. In the words of this Portuguese army private:
Most were dressed very poorly [and] some were hostile to the situation in 
Indonesia which seemed to be very bad at that time. When [the frontline troops] 
gathered up these border crossers who had entered [East Timor] illegally and 
tried to send them back using the PIDE [Polfcia Internacional e de Defesa do 
Estado, International Police for the Defense of the State, i.e., the Salazarist secret 
police], they were not received by Governor El Tari in Kupang. He said he did not 
want these orang [delinquent people] being sent back. The Atambua-border 
crossers also said that if they were sent back to Atambua and the [local 
Indonesian] government knew that they had tried to get into East Timor, they 
would all be killed. [They said], in Atambua if you have a buffalo, the second 
buffalo has to be given to the government. If you have a kebon [market garden, 
orchard], half the crop has to go to the government. So there was a perception of 
Indonesia as being (1) very poor; (2) very disorganized; (3) really quite brutal. 
(Interview with Moises do Amaral, Lisbon, April 11, 1999)
Although some had access to radios—there were no newspapers in East Timor until 
the launch of A Voz de Timor (The Voice of Timor) in the early 1970s — the broadcasts 
were essentially about events in Portuguese-run East Timor and developments in the 
distant Portugal of Salazar's Estado Novo (New State). "We would not know about 
what was going on in West Timor, let alone [inner island] Indonesia," stated the same 
private in Portugal's colonial army. Others indicated that although they did listen to 
the radio and knew about major events such as the Vietnam War (1961-73), they never 
discussed politics, even in their own families. One woman bom in the late 1950s, who 
later went on to become a member of the OPMT and a female combatant on the north- 
central front in the late 1970s, stated: "We knew, or at least my parents knew, that if
flee up to Mt. Matebian for refuge. I was nearly ten years old at the time. Several members of the local elite 
[liurai] and local village heads [chefe de suco] joined in, and there was a major crackdown by the 
Portuguese. Many people were sent to Angola, to Atauro and to Dili as prisoners. [Many] others were 
killed [some estimates put the death toll as high as one thousand; see Gunn, Timor Loro Sae, p. 260.]— seven 
were killed in my hamlet near Uatolari alone in the aftermath of this crackdown.
Interview with Moises do Amaral, Lisbon, April 11,1999.
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we discussed politics that could be dangerous. [My parents] were afraid that if they 
spoke of such things, the children would talk about them outside and they themselves 
would come under the surveillance of the PIDE. So although we knew about such things 
we did not discuss them." (Interview with Bemardina Fernandes Alves, nom-de-guerre 
"Ohar," Lisbon, April 12, 1999).
The Portuguese even seem to have encouraged a view of Indonesia as "backward" 
and "uncivilized" in order to highlight the supposed benefits of living under the 
protection of Lisbon in a colony that they pretended was something of an island of 
peace in a violent and politically tumultuous region. Echoing the words of Bernardina 
Fernandes Alves, the OPMT member, the young Domingos Sarmento Alves (bom Ossu, 
1964), who later became one of the leaders of the clandestine movement and local 
leader of Renetil (Resistencia Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor Leste, East Timorese 
National Students' Resistance), and who now is special advisor on international 
relations to President Xanana Gusmao, stated that his teachers at the Salesian School 
at Venilale "had very negative views [about Indonesia] . . . they said it was a very 
backward country. It was a place which was dirty, where people ate with their hands 
and didn't use knives and forks." (Interview with Domingos Sarmento Alves, Lisbon, 
November 13, 1999). The same views were reflected by the octogenarian customary 
chief of Atsabe, Guilherme Gongalves, a member of the privileged generation of 
Portuguese-educated assimilados (assimilated natives18), when he described Indonesia 
as "a country which is very behind, very backward . . . .  They made a lot of promises 
[to me and the East Timorese] but never lived up to any of them." (Interview with 
Guilherme Gonsalves, Liurai of Atsabe, Lisbon, April 14,1999)
Few interviewees, however, gave so vivid an indication of the sheer scale of the 
ignorance regarding Indonesia as the young Domingos Matos (born Dili, 1972), who 
was in his first year of Portuguese primary school when the Indonesians invaded in 
1975. As Matos told us:
I didn't know what country these people had come from actually. We had no 
maps at home, no atlases or globes. I really didn't know where Indonesia was. I 
thought that perhaps the Indonesians were from China because we were 
constantly calling them tuan,19 which I think is a version of tuan besar [Big Sir], the 
usual address we used for the Chinese, and I thought they were from China, even 
from Beijing. My father too saw them as Chinese. It was only when I was about 
eight years old [in 1979] when I was going to the [Indonesian] primary school that 
I realized they were from Indonesia.
When I was eight, in the primary school, we learnt Indonesian and Indonesian 
history. Indeed, in the period 1975-80, my father and mother had constantly said 
the tuan were only here to bring the situation in East Timor under control. "They 
are here to bring peace to our country," they said reassuringly. But then they 
didn't leave. They stayed and stayed, and the situation caused them to question
18 Donald Weatherbee, "Portuguese Timor: An Indonesian Dilemma/'Asian Survey 16,12 (1966): 684. The 
assimilados, who constituted a miniscule 0.25 percent of the 700,000-strong pre-1975 East Timorese 
population, enjoyed special privileges under the Portuguese, including freedom from corporal punishment, 
labor services, and payment of the head tax.
19 tuan: title of respect for adult Dutch males, colonial period; male head of household, "master"; or term of 
address, equivalent to "sir."
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why? My parents remembered the Fretilin flag under which we had declared our 
independence on November 28, 1975, which was replaced [after December 7, 
1975] by the merah-putih, the red-and-white flag of the Republic of Indonesia. 
Then this merah-putih continued to float over Dili, and it was never taken down. 
The situation was confusing for me too. If the Indonesians had come here just to 
bring the situation under control, why didn't they leave? My parents seemed to 
be quite afraid: they talked in hushed tones and said the country was now being 
colonized by Jakarta and that was why the Indonesians were not going home. 
(Interview with Domingos Matos, Lisbon, November 7,1999)
It is evident that the depth of the confusion and misunderstanding about Indonesia 
in the years leading up to the 1975 invasion made it much more difficult for the East 
Timorese leaders of the recently established pro-independence and pro-autonomy 
parties to develop a coherent analysis of the New Order regime and the motivations of 
the Indonesian generals. Even if they had, there was little chance that the subsequent 
invasion would have been avoided, but perhaps a more nuanced and informed view of 
Indonesia amongst the local population might have enabled the East Timorese to come 
up rather sooner with more skillful ways of handling the invaders, thus mitigating some 
of the mindless savagery of the early conquest years.
2. Varieties of East Timorese Responses to the Indonesians during the Years of 
Military Occupation and Clandestine Struggle (1979-99)
(i) Relations with the Military
In the early years following the Indonesian invasion, East Timor was a divided 
territory: the main population centers and lowland areas came under Indonesian 
military control, but Falintil units continued to hold substantial territory in the 
mountains where Fretilin (Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente, 
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) organized life in the so-called 
"liberated zones." It was only at the end of this initial period of occupation (1975-79) 
that the Indonesians, with the help of counter-insurgency aircraft (OV-lOF Broncos) 
supplied courtesy of Jimmy Carter's "human rights" administration (1976-80), broke 
through into the mountains and destroyed the remaining Falintil strongholds. This was 
the period which witnessed the most dramatic loss of life amongst the civilian 
population, partly through intensive aerial bombardment, partly through hunger due to 
the displacement of large numbers from their lands, and partly through the intentional 
targeting of Fretilin leaders and their families by the Indonesians. Domingos Sarmento 
Alves, whose family had been forced down from the mountains above Ossu to 
Viqueque, described this period vividly to us:
"It was a very very tense situation in 1979-81. There were constant killings. 
The Indonesians showed a smiling face to try and speed up the surrender 
process, but once the formal resistance on Mt. Matebian was at an end and the 
scattered Falintil remnants began to gather under Xanana's leadership [at Mt. 
Paichau] in the Ponta Leste region, the killings began in earnest. The Indonesians 
killed off the surrendered Fretilin soldiers one by one. Sometimes I remember 
members of Fretilin playing football with each other, and the next morning they
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just simply were not there any more. They just disappeared by night. Every night 
there were killings.
"One could say that the Indonesians had now begun to openly flaunt the fact 
that they could torture people with impunity. So they went about their 
[gruesome] work realizing that they had the upper hand and did not need to 
present a smiling face any more. Realizing that the formal Fretilin resistance was 
now formally defeated and with no journalists or outsiders filing reports, they 
began to flaunt their cruelty openly. I remember a public castration and killing of 
a first cousin of the second Fretilin President, Nicolau Lobato [in office, 
1977-78], who had himself been killed on December 31, 1978. This first cousin 
was brought out before the entire community of Viqueque, who were forced to 
witness the mutilation, and [he] was castrated in public and then killed. Some of 
the locals had to take him and bury him—or at least what was left of him—in a 
grave which they had dug close to the river.
"Then there was another situation in 1979 when Uatolari was attacked. There 
were two people [Falintil fighters?] who were publicly beheaded, and the 
Indonesian military brought the heads back to the Viqueque district military 
headquarters [Kodim], where they took photographs of soldiers standing on their 
[the severed] heads, the heads on the ground, or putting them up on tables. In the 
end they placed the heads on pikes and displayed them [outside the Kodim 1630 
HQ in the center of town]. Every day was like that: there was always a killing 
[and] something was always going on at night.
"I would also like to talk about another incident that affected me very deeply 
at the time in 1979-81. One of my school friends was a young girl of eleven and 
her father was Timorese. He was a local mechanic, and he mended vehicle 
engines. [One day] an Indonesian sergeant came out of the military base in 
Viqueque and asked the father of this young girl if he would be able to repair his 
truck. The East Timorese mechanic obviously didn't understand much Indonesian 
so he refused. His daughter, the young eleven-year-old, was then shot dead right 
in front of him. She was shot in the eye, and the bullet came out at the back of her 
head, and she fell to the ground. This all happened just a hundred meters from 
my own house right in the middle of Viqueque at seven o'clock in the morning just 
as we were setting out for school. It was a real hellhole in Viqueque at that time."
"Were there no priests who might have been able to alleviate the situation?"
"Yes, there was Father Domingos, who later became known as Padre 
Maubere, 'the priest of the Maubere [highland Timorese] people.' He was sent to 
serve the combined parish of Ossu and Viqueque, but because of the power which 
the Indonesian military wielded at that time he could really do very little. It was a 
situation of absolutely no hope. We had no links with the outside world, and 
there were no journalists coming in and out to report. It was a situation where 
complete impunity prevailed. Indeed, it was such a dangerous place that usually 
mothers didn't allow their children to go out on the roads at night for fear of 
what might happen. You might have a soldier cleaning his gun and then fire 
testing the weapon, but if he was in a frustrated mood he might randomly test it 
against a human being who just happened to be walking by. People were just not 
safe on the streets. It was a completely willful situation. People were attacked 
with impunity and for no apparent reason. It was completely random.
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"C Company of [the locally raised] Timorese battalion 745 [based in Baucau, 
many of whose recruits hailed from neighboring West Timor and other eastern 
Indonesian areas20] gained a terrifying reputation for violence and cruelty. They 
killed every night. We used to say that really a chicken was of more value than a 
human being because at least chickens were counted up—and the owner might 
say, well, I will have that one today and that one tomorrow, and I will save those 
others for next week or a month's time. But with human beings they just picked 
them off as and when they pleased. Every night there were disappearances. Even 
in my school there were girls who were raped or forced into sexual relations with 
Indonesian soldiers, and we did not dare say anything. If you said anything there 
would be serious repercussions." (Interview with Domingos Sarmento Alves, 
Lisbon, November 13, 1999)
In January 1981, just seven months before he moved to Dili to pursue his studies 
and board with an uncle in the marginal safety of the colonial capital, Domingos (then 
aged sixteen) and one of his classmates experienced what it was like to fall foul of this 
selfsame C Company unit. A Timorese auxiliary (Tentara Bantu Operasi, TBO)
20 For a good discussion of the Indonesian attempt to "Timorize" their military operations by setting up 
locally recruited battalions 744 (based in Dili) and 745 (based in Baucau), see Carmel Budiardjo and Liem 
Soei Liong, The War Against East Timor (London: Zed Books, 1984), p. 40, who note that Indonesian efforts 
to recruit Timorese started early in the war in 1976 (i.e., a year after the December 1975 invasion). Besides 
the two "Timorese" battalions, which were in fact only half East Timorese when formed (the rest being 
recruited from West Timor, Java, and other parts of Indonesia, especially NTT), a civil defense corps 
(Hansip/Pertahanan Sipil) composed entirely of East Timorese was set up. But the Indonesian military 
received little benefit from the armed "Timorese" units they created. The brutal and senseless killing ordered 
by ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) commanders 
shocked and disheartened many local recruits, and by the 1980s the number of East Timorese in these 
formations was being rapidly reduced (by 1999, it had dropped to just 23 percent). Many Hansip soldiers 
also deserted to Falintil, taking their weapons with them, especially during the March-August 1983 
ceasefire, when a whole Hansip unit in the village of Kraras (near Viqueque) close to the south coast turned 
on a contingent of Indonesian army engineers, killing all seventeen of them before fleeing into the mountains 
to join up with Fretilin. See Cox et al., Generations of Resistance, p. 31. By the end of their occupation in the 
late 1990s, not a single one of the 211 senior officers/commanders in the Indonesian military in East Timor 
appears to have been East Timorese. Most of those still serving with ABRI (post-April 1999, ABRI became 
TNI) were kept at the most junior levels (90 percent were corporals and privates, and the majority of these 
were not even full-time soldiers, but were Milsas [Militerisasi, part-time reservists]); see Samuel Moore 
(pseud.), "The Indonesian Military's Last Years in East Timor: An Analysis of its Secret Documents," 
Indonesia 72 (2001): 28. Only one of the four Battalion 744 and 745 members identified by the National 
Human Rights Sub-Commission (KOMNASHAM's) report for Human Rights Violations in East Timor 
(KPP-HAM) was guilty of human rights abuses during the pre-and post-August 30,1999 referendum 
violence; Private (First Class) Lufs appears to have been East Timorese. The others, Infantry Majors 
Yakraman Yagus and Jacob Djoko Sarosa, commanders of Battalions 744 and 745 respectively, and Captain 
Tatang, the commander of 744's B Company, hailed from Indonesia proper—Yagus apparently from either 
Ujung Pandang (Makasar) or NTT, Sarosa from Kupang, and Tatang from West Java. See further A. 
Hasibuan and T. M. Lubis (chairpersons), "KPP-HAM Report. Indonesian Investigation into Human Rights 
Violations in East Timor," para 73, Jakarta, January 31, 2000, published in H. Macdonald et al., "Masters 
of Terror—Indonesia's Military and Violence in East Timor in 1999," Canberra Papers on Strategy and 
Defense (Canberra: Australian National Univesity, 2002); and Cameron W. Barr, "A Brutal Exit: Battalion 
745," The Christian Science Monitor 13 (2000), who refers to the killing of the Dutch journalist, Sander 
Thoenes (then on assignment for The Financial Times, Vrij Nederland, and other Dutch newspapers) in the 
Becora district of Dili on September 21,1999, apparently at the hands of members of Battalion 745, who 
were passing through the district at the time.
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working for the Indonesians21 reported them as saying that given the situation in 
Viqueque, it was a miracle that they were still alive and that "although the Indonesians 
accused Fretilin of being 'communists/ really they were even more 'communist' than the 
Timorese pro-independence party, considering the way they behaved." (Interview with 
Domingos Sarmento Alves, Lisbon, November 13, 1999). Knowing that once this 
comment reached the ears of C Company, they would be done for, Domingos and his 
friend decided to appeal to the head of intelligence (KASI-1)22 at the Kodim. They 
invented a story about a crush on one of Domingos's school friend's attractive young 
female classmates, which had brought him into conflict with a Battalion 745 soldier. 
As Domingos told us, they knew that their only salvation was to trust that rivalries 
within the Indonesian army would work in their favor. What followed is a dramatic 
illustration of both the violence that underlay relations between the separate ABRI 
(Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) 
commands in occupied Timor, and the lack of unified military hierarchy:
We left our classroom and went straight to the intelligence officer's office, 
reporting that the school was about to be attacked. He said "Nonsense: we 
cleared this up yesterday, all this business about the love affair." But no sooner 
had he uttered these words than his office came under siege. Battalion 745 
soldiers in full battle dress started climbing through the windows, and we dung 
for dear life to the intelligence officer. We bound our arms tightly around him 
because we knew if we let go we were dead. We heard him shouting: "Mana 
senjata? Mana pistol saya?"[Where is my weapon? Where is my pistol?] We 
thought that if the 745 soldiers took out their guns and started firing, the 
intelligence officer would also be killed and they would be held responsible for his 
death. Obviously they didn't want that, so we held on to him for dear life. But 
they beat us cruelly, hundreds of blows raining down on our backs. Then they 
started battering us with the table and used the chairs to prise off our arms. One 
of the 745 soldiers drew his stabbing knife with a garuda [mythical bird] 
embossed hilt and started hitting us with it. I had deep wounds to my head and 
the whole of my bottom lip was ripped open so that afterwards I couldn't drink 
water for weeks without the liquid running down my neck. We were in a truly 
dreadful situation. Covered in blood, we clung to the intelligence officer who 
eventually slipped to the ground. Forced to release our grip, we were dragged 
from the office, hauled across the street and flung down the steps leading to the 
school where the 745 soldiers began beating our heads with stones. The 
intelligence officer immediately phoned the Kodim commander who had just 
come back from his afternoon siesta. He wasn't even in his uniform since he had 
been resting. As he came over to the school with his orderly hurrying behind him
21 On the numerous agents provocateurs and spies, the latter referred to as "clowns" (bufo) by the Timorese, 
see Peter Carey, "A Personal Journey through East Timor," in The East Timor Question: The Struggle for 
Independence from Indonesia, ed. Paul Hainsworth and Stephen McCloskey (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), p. 
23. Bishop Belo once observed that East Timor under Indonesian occupation was a society "where one half 
of the population was paid to spy on the other half." See Clare Dixon, "Cry of a Forgotten Land," The 
Tablet, November 22,1991.
22 KASI stands for Kepala Seksi (Section Head), of which there were usually four levels in the ABRI / TNI 
territorial command structure: KASI-1 = intelligence; KASI-2 = operations; KASI-3 = logistics; KASI-4 = 
personnel. I am grateful to Benedict Anderson for this information.
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carrying his things, he began buttoning himself into his tunic. We met him outside 
the school as he was putting on his uniform and reported what had happened. 
He ordered us to the Kodim HQ where we were put in his personal quarters. 
There we were kept for two days and nights while the 745 soldiers laid siege to 
the Kodim. They took up positions just across the road in front of the church. 
With an armed face-off taking place, the Kodim commander and his 745 
Battalion opposite number started shouting at each other: "What do you think 
you're doing? Why are you treating these schoolchildren like this?" the Kodim 
commander yelled. The breakdown in military discipline was complete. At night 
the 745 soldiers invaded the Kodim and came into the kitchen with their guns, 
but we were by then safe in the commander's bedroom.
When I eventually got out to Dili [in July 1981] I heard that this C Company 
unit had got completely out of control and had killed an Indonesian marine corps 
[KKO, Korps Marinir] NCO on the boy scouts' field [lapangan pramuka]. Several 
745 soldiers were later arrested for this crime and imprisoned after being 
dishonorably discharged from the army. (Interview, Domingos Sarmento Alves, 
Lisbon, November 13, 1999)
While the experience of East Timorese, who, like Domingos, lived in remote 
districts, and especially those who had been forced down from the mountains, was 
almost universally terrible, there were some exceptions. The young Aquiles Sequeira 
(born August 10, 1978), for example, spoke to me warmly about the same marine corps 
unit from Surabaya, which Domingos had mentioned, during the period it was 
stationed in Aquiles's native Lore district in 1987-88:
We had units of the Wanra [Perlawanan Rakyat, People's Resistance], a sort of 
civil defense unit or militia, which were recruited from the western part of East 
Timor, namely, from Maliana and the border area near Atambua, and they were 
constantly coming back to our house. Sometimes they brought food and in the 
evenings we would invite them in to drink palm toddy [tuak]. They often took me 
back to the local military post, and I was quite happy there with the Indonesian 
soldiers. In fact, I didn't know what was really going on [politically] at the time. 
Instead, the Indonesians often seemed to play with us children, and I thought 
they were rather good people. At that time [1987-88], the war was getting fiercer 
and the unit stationed in our area were marines [KKO] from Surabaya. (Interview 
with Aquiles Sequeira, Lisbon, April 10,1999)
Likewise, in the colonial capital, Dili, the situation seemed to depend very much on 
where one lived and what particular units were based in one's quarter of the city. 
Indeed, as the Indonesian occupation began to establish more regular structures once 
the campaign to control the mountainous hinterland had been more or less won by the 
early 1980s (only some three hundred Falintil fighters continued to hold out in the 
extreme eastern tip of the island under the leadership of Xanana Gusmao, a number 
which fell to less than one hundred by the end of the decade), the East Timorese began 
to develop a very acute appreciation of the nuances and differences both between 
various Indonesian military units and between the different ethnic groups from which 
they were drawn. Thus, the young Domingos Matos, whose family lived in the early 
1980s in the Bairro Pet6 area close to the elite helicopter-borne Indonesian Kopasgat
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(Komando Pasukan Gerakan Cepat, Rapid Reaction Unit) airforce commando base, 
had a very different view of his Indonesian neighbors than did the terrorized Domingos 
Sarmento Alves in far-off Viqueque, where the notorious C Company of East Timorese 
Battalion 745 held sway:
"[Relations with the Indonesians] were pretty good. The Kopasgat were an 
elite force, and they behaved quite well. They gave us rice and other food, and 
indeed did the same to all the other families living around the base."
"Was the rice and food only for those who worked in some official capacity 
for the Indonesian local administration?"
"No, it was for everybody, for all the families living around the airfield. In 
fact, the Kopasgat men used to come to our house to wash because they had no 
washing facilities of their own at their base. There thus seemed to be a reasonably 
cordial relationship between the Indonesians and the locals there."
"Did your mother and father speak Indonesian?"
"No, we only communicated by hand signals with the soldiers." (Interview 
with Domingos Matos, Lisbon, November 7,1999)
Interestingly, when problems arose between Matos's family and the Indonesian 
military, these involved the local Koramil (Komando Rayon Militer, Sub-District 
Military Command) rather than the elite airforce commando unit quartered in their 
area:
"It was [only] in 1980 that the first incident occurred that caused me to begin 
to feel a bit disturbed and start to take a different view of the situation. We had 
a pig at home which went missing and my mother went down to the local army 
base—not the Kopasgat but the regular army base [Koramil]—to argue with the 
soldiers because she suspected that they had taken the pig and eaten it. She 
asked for the pig back in quite insistent language. That evening, the commandant 
of the base, a field officer, came round armed with a pistol and ordered my 
mother to sit down and began interrogating her, pressing the barrel to her temple 
and whiplashing her with the pistol butt."
"What language did the interrogation occur in?"
"In Tetum and Indonesian. In fact, we had an interpreter, a woman who spent 
time going to and fro to Kupang [in West Timor] so that she knew some 
Indonesian and could act as an interpreter. It was at that time that the feelings 
began to arise in me that the situation was anything but normal. I was then eight 
years old." (Interview with Domingos Matos, Lisbon, November 7,1999)
It is clear from the testimony of one of one of Matos's younger contemporaries, Ana 
Maria Vitor ("Nina") (born Dfli, 1974), a Dili resident and daughter of a junior civil 
servant in the Portuguese colonial administration who spoke Bahasa fluently (a 
language he had apparently learnt on his own initiative in the Portuguese era), that 
knowledge of Malay or Indonesian was of little avail in providing protection against 
the Indonesian authorities:
My father was able to speak Malay—he was quite a linguist and had learnt it out 
of intellectual curiosity during the Portuguese period—so we decided to stay in 
Dfli and not go into the mountains. But, despite his fluency in Bahasa, we still 
had problems. For example, we had trouble with an East Timorese neighbor who
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knew my family was giving rice and other necessities to the Fretilin forces in the 
mountains [in 1976-78]. He reported my father to the authorities, and they put 
him in prison. I was still very small then. (Interview with Ana Maria Vitor, 
"Nina," Alvalade, Lisbon, April 14, 1999)
The same problems were experienced by another Dili-based female, Delfina de 
Rego, whose father had actually worked as a junior civil servant for the Indonesian 
local government in Dili before succumbing to an illness in 1982. As we have seen, she 
eventually bought herself out of East Timor in 1996 with the help of an uncle based in 
Lisbon. (Interview with Delfina Maria de Jesus de Rego Soriano, Lisbon, November 10, 
1999) At a slightly later epoch in the mid-1980s, after the breakdown of the March- 
August 1983 ceasefire, which had been negotiated by the Indonesian special forces 
(Kopassandha, Komando Pasukan Sandhi Yuda, Covert Warfare Forces Command; 
post-December 1986, Kopassus, Komando Pasukan Khusus, Special Forces 
Command) local intelligence chief, Colonel Gatot Purwanto, and Xanana Gusmao,23 
many local men began going up to join the armed resistance in the mountains. At this 
time, two young Fataluku boys from the Ponta Leste region, Ejfdio Tomas Dias 
Quintas (b. 1975) and Honorio de Araujo (b. 1977), growing up in the village of 
Mihara (near Lospalos), who both later went on to play a role in the post-1989 
clandestine movement, began to develop a very detailed knowledge of the types of 
units which were billeted in their area, learning to distinguish the battalion numbers 
and their respective regional affiliations, military competence, armaments and 
equipment:
At that time, the only Indonesians [around Mihara] were soldiers. There were no 
transmigrants then, no people who opened warungs or small shops. The 
Indonesians there were all essentially combat troops, mainly from the infantry 
battalions 641 from East Kalimantan, 745 from Minahasa [North Sulawesi], 710 
from Menado, 700 from North Sulawesi, cavalry, and Armed, an artillery unit. 
(Interview with Ejfdio Dias Quintas and Honorio de Araujo, Lisbon, November 
9, 1999)
23 By late 1982, Falintil was launching a number of attacks in many parts of the country, especially the 
south and east, and in November 1982 even attacked Dili. Increasingly placed on the defensive, a number of 
local commanders entered into ceasefire agreements with Falintil, culminating in the countrywide ceasefire 
agreement signed on March 23,1983; see Pinto and Jardine, East Timor's Unfinished Struggle, p. 266, n. 1. 
Also Colonel Gatot Purwanto and the other Indonesian commanders involved in negotiating the ceasefire, 
e.g., Major (now Major-General) Willem da Costa, hoped that by agreeing to the countrywide cessation of 
hostilities, they might achieve a "Sulawesi" solution to the East Timor problem: namely, the sort of 
arrangement that ended the Permesta rebellion (1957-61) in North Sulawesi in 1961, involving a ceasefire 
combined with amnesty arrangements, and an honorable part for the rebels in a post-rebellion settlement. 
This proved a chimera in the East Timor situation, however, since there was no sense of common history to 
which the Indonesians could appeal. One of the central ideas of the "Sulawesi" solution had been the 
restoration of the Indonesian "unitary" state (negara kesatuan Republik Indonesia), but this meant nothing to 
the Timorese guerrillas who never had any intention of joining Indonesia and suspected a trap in the 
various amnesty promises, given what had happened in 1978-79, when so many Fretilin fighters had come 
down from the mountains under the flag of peace only to be subsequently murdered by the Indonesians. 
Instead, Xanana and other Falintil commanders used the breathing space of the ceasefire to rebuild their 
armed strength, consolidate their underground networks, reorganize their supply lines, and restore links 
with the civilian population and the outside world, links that reinvigorated the international solidarity 
movement and prepared the ground for the emergence of the student-led urban clandestine resistance in Dili 
and other towns in the late 1980s. See Budiardjo and Liem, War against East Timor, pp. 44-7.
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Like Domingos Sarmento Alves, they noticed that the Indonesian security forces were 
far from united amongst themselves. Indeed, in 1984, they witnessed a major clash 
between two battalions, one from Aceh and the other from West Kalimantan 
(Pontianak), over the Acehnese unit's conduct in their home village:
There were often fights between the police and the army, usually over issues to do 
with money or commercial issues or property. Often there were armed stand-offs 
between different military units. We remember a military unit, Battalion 100 from 
the Iskandarmuda Command [Kodam I] in Aceh. It started carrying out mass 
killings around Mihara, lots of corpses were being chucked around and left lying 
in the open around the village. Some were thrown down wells, others were put in 
animal pens, and all these bodies had to be burned. Battalion 623 from 
Pontianak in West Kalimantan [Kodam XII Tanjungpura] got very upset about 
this and decided to take on the Acehnese Battalion. They wanted them out of 
Mihara. This was in 1984. So many people had been kidnapped, tortured, and 
executed by Battalion 100 from Banda Aceh that the rival battalion from West 
Kalimantan took them on [and expelled them], (Interview with Ejfdio Tomas 
Dias Quintas and Honorio de Araujo, Lisbon, November 9, 1999)
Ejfdio Tomas Dias Quintas (born Lospalos, 1975). Lisbon, November 1999. 
Copyright © The Leverhulme Trust (London) "Survivors Project."
Another aspect that the keen-eyed Ejfdio noticed was that many Indonesian 
soldiers had their own agenda and were looking after their own interests rather than 
acting as members of a unified and professional army. This gave those working for the
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clandestine resistance ample opportunities to pursue their activities and even procure 
armaments and other necessary supplies for the resistance in the mountains from the 
Indonesians:
I often talked with them and they told me: "Quite frankly, I am working for 
myself, I am working for my own family. I have got to survive, and as far as my 
religion is concerned, it teaches me not to torture or execute people. Basically, I 
am here to advance my own interests, not that of the state. I am not really a 100 
percent paid-up Indonesian nationalist in this respect. I have to look at the 
present conditions; and I have to tell you straight that if you do something which 
is against the rules and I see you doing it, then I am going to arrest you. But if you 
do something [illegal] which I don't see, then that is entirely up to you. I am not 
going to go around officiously investigating everything. It is thus entirely up to 
you. If you want to carry out actions which are not above-board, then provided I 
don't see it, that's fine—what I don't see, I don't know." (Interview with Ejfdio 
Dias Quintas, Lisbon, November 9, 1999)
Such opportunities for barter were especially exploited by those who pretended to 
be working as spies for the Indonesians. The former were, in Ejidio's words,
to some extent the eyes and ears of Falintil—they worked ostensibly for the 
Indonesians but they also reported back via estafeta [the clandestine messenger 
system] to Falintil on the situation of the local Indonesian garrison, the 
disposition of their forces, where the units were from, what arms they had. They 
bartered, stole, or bought weapons, ammunition and uniforms, in fact anything 
Falintil needed, and it was a [highly effective] way of actually infiltrating the 
Indonesian military and getting support for Falintil. (Interview with Ejfdio Dias 
Quintas, Lisbon, November 9, 1999)
(ii) Relations at School
As the Indonesians settled into the occupation of East Timor in the early 1980s, 
one of their top priorities was to establish an Indonesian-language school system. They 
began with the primary level (Sekolah Dasar) and required that all young East 
Timorese in the six-to-thirteen age group attend. In their view, this educational 
experience would gradually win over the younger generation (born in the early to mid 
1970s) to an acceptance of Indonesian rule, just as the Dutch "ethical policy" 
(1901-20s) in late-colonial Indonesia/Netherlands East Indies was to induce 
Indonesians to accept Dutch rule. Thus, while the pre-1975 generation, schooled under 
the Portuguese, was written off as irreconcilably opposed to Jakarta's annexation, 
hopes were pinned on the "new" generation, in particular members of the 
younger—Indonesian-educated—Timorese elite, some of whom would go on to tertiary 
education in inner-island Indonesia itself. (By the end of Indonesian rule, there were 
over one thousand Timorese students enrolled in various Indonesian universities and 
tertiary colleges, the majority in Java and Bali.) The reality was very different, however. 
Far from winning over the younger generation, Indonesian schooling, especially at the 
junior and senior high school level, became a highly divisive experience, reinforcing the 
East Timorese younger generation's sense of separate identity and the validity of their 
political aspirations for independence. Nearly all those interviewed spoke of the poor 
quality of the education provided by the Indonesians. This was particularly the case in
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areas outside Dili. In the Ponta Leste region, the young Honorio de Araujo reflected 
that when he left school at thirteen, "I really had nothing of value in my head. It was a 
very primitive form of education, where the pupils were physically abused. There was 
constant corporal punishment. It was a sort of boot camp school, very rough and 
ready." (Interview with Honorio de Araujo, Lisbon, November 9, 1999) There was also 
a shared view that Indonesian schoolteachers tended to favor Indonesian students over 
East Timorese, a discrimination which contributed to the growing sense of separateness 
that pupils from the two communities began to feel as they went through the various 
levels of the Indonesian school system. Martinho Maia Gonsalves (b. 1970) spoke to us 
as a member of the first generation schooled under the Indonesians in the East 
Timorese capital:
It started when I was in Class 1 of my junior high school [SMP] in 1985. Before 
then I was in primary school [1976-84]. Certainly my friends and I were not 
happy with the Indonesians. We had strong anti-Indonesian feelings, and we 
called those children of military families at the school the grenat [grenade] group 
from the Indonesian, "gerakan anak tentara" [army children's group]. We felt 
aggrieved because priority seemed to be given in terms of access to the high school 
[SMA] and junior high school [SMP] to Indonesian children, especially children of 
military families. There were often fights, and we frequently came to blows. From 
that time onwards I never really wanted to mix with the Indonesians. (Interview 
with Martinho Maia Gonsalves, Lisbon, April 15,1999)
In 1988, Martinho and his fellow East Timorese students mounted a demonstration 
in front of Governor Mario Carrascalao's office in downtown Dili to protest the fact 
that so many "newcomers" from Indonesia had succeeded in passing their exams for 
entry into senior high school, while scores of East Timorese had failed, a demonstration 
backed by Raimundo, the sympathetic East Timorese Bupati of Dili at the time. 
(Interview with Martinho Maia Gonsalves, Lisbon, April 15, 1999) When a second test 
was held and some male East Timorese pupils found themselves still excluded, they 
took their frustration out on the Indonesians, assaulting Indonesian female students in 
the school canteen, an unlovely but seemingly common behavior pattern amongst young 
Timorese males who have a habit of venting their frustration by beating up women.24 
At such times, according to Martinho, the Indonesian army "[would come] to try and 
sort things out and offer the Indonesians some protection." (Interview with Martinho 
Maia Gonsalves, April 15, 1999)
Many other post-1975 "new" generation Timorese remarked on this pattern of 
growing separation from their fellow Indonesian students in junior and senior high
24 In the year 2000, there were some 169 documented cases of domestic violence by Timorese men against 
women, including some involving members of the politically prominent Timorese elite (e.g., Dr. Sergio Lobo, 
the former chairman of the ETTA's Department of Health). Such crimes are now the single most important 
category of offense, constituting some 40 percent of all criminal cases against persons and property being 
heard in the Timorese courts. See further Milena Pires cited in Maggie O'Kane, "Return of the 
Revolutionaries," The Guardian (London), January 15, 2001; and Peter Carey, "Challenging Tradition, 
Changing Society: The Role of Women in East Timor's Transition to Independence," in Rodrigues and 
Wharton, Nationbuilding in East Timor, p. 96; and, for a longer discussion of the violent legacy of the 
occupation in terms of crimes against women, see Peter Carey, "Dimensions of Domination: Institutionalised 
Violence against Women during the Indonesian Occupation of East Timor (1975-99)" in Wessel and 
Wimhoefer, Violence in Indonesia, pp. 185-209.
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school. The Timorese poet, Joao Aparfcio, who earlier trained for the priesthood in an 
Indonesian seminary in Malang in East Java, relayed his memories to us in this way:
In July 1992,1 went back to Malang to begin my Bachelor's degree. In East Timor, 
the situation was very bad. This was the aftermath of the November 12, 1991 
Santa Cruz massacre. Many of my friends were dying and disappearing. There 
was just no freedom to speak or live as ordinary people. Despite all their 
educational upbringing, my friends just could not live normally. This caused an 
inner revolt in me. I was staying in the seminary, but it was becoming clearer and 
clearer in my mind that this was not my path in life. There was a growing conflict 
between me and the rector, Fr. Joao, who was a Javanese. He seemed to have two 
weights and two measures: one for the Javanese and one for the Timorese. There 
were fifteen of us [lay] brothers from East Timor [training for the priesthood], 
and we were constantly being told by the rector that we should agree to 
integration and should tell the Bishop [Belo] that the diocese of Dili should be 
joined with the Indonesian Bishops' Conference [KWI, Konperensi Wali-Gereja 
Indonesia] rather than remaining under the direct administration of the Vatican. [I 
was told that] I should not think so much about my homeland, but should 
develop a broader and more Catholic viewpoint. I protested to the rector that 
this was not the way forward. But he remained hard in his attitudes, and in the 
end I just decided to leave. I wrote to Bishop Belo telling him that really I did not 
have the calling to be a priest, but I did not mention at the time that I would go 
abroad. (Interview with Joao Aparfcio, Lisbon, April 11, 1999)
Domingos Matos, who was at that time back in Dili, attending junior high school in 
the Comoro area near the airport, recalled that:
"My schooling was not very regular and the surroundings not particularly 
good. It seemed that the Timorese in my neighborhood were gradually being 
overwhelmed by inner-island Indonesians, particularly Javanese, who were 
coming to settle in Dili."
"Was this happening before the formal opening of the territory in January 
1989?"
"Yes, even in the early [to mid] 1980s, the pattern was becoming clear: Dili 
was becoming an increasingly Indonesian city, and transmigrants were flooding in 
large numbers."
"Was there a sense that you were being marginalized at school?"
"No, the class one of primary school I was in was entirely for East Timorese 
children. The inner-island Indonesians and Javanese were educated elsewhere; 
they certainly didn't come to my class at school. But when I went into class two 
and three, there were quite a few children of Indonesian transmigrants, and the 
school became increasingly mixed. I did not feel terribly easy with a lot of 
Indonesians there. In 1985, I graduated from primary school and went to the 
Number Two junior state high school [SMP-II] at Comoro where the airport is 
now. There I really began to understand what the situation was like in East 
Timor." (Interview with Domingos Matos, Lisbon, November 7,1999)
It was above all the study of Indonesian history and constitutional law (i.e., the 
basic law [Undang-Undang Dasar, UUD] of 1945) that caused young East Timorese
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like Domingos Matos and his friend Martinho Maia Gonsalves to reflect more deeply 
on the iniquities of the Indonesian occupation. As Domingos explained to us:
I began to study history, the official national history of Indonesia. I also looked at 
the basic constitutional law [UUD] which said that the Indonesian people and 
state would recognize and respect the freedom of all other people in the world. I 
then began to put two and two together in terms of the actual situation in my 
own country. (Interview with Domingos Matos, Lisbon, November 7,1999)
Martinho's experience paralleled this, but with an interesting twist, in that at times 
his Indonesian teachers clearly felt acutely embarrassed by what they were being called 
upon to defend, embarrassment which sometimes even forced them to leave the 
classroom in order to cover their feelings:
I knew from pretty early on what the score was, but when we were studying 
Indonesian history we also looked at the Basic Constitutional Law of 1945, 
which stated that "freedom was the right of all peoples and all nations." We 
would often provoke our teacher into reflecting on whether this basic 
constitutional law was being applied properly in East Timor, and whether, in 
view of the fact that the Indonesians had risen against the Dutch25 and against 
the Japanese [1942-45], we asked whether the East Timorese situation was not 
rather similar? Surely this was also a colonial situation? Usually the teacher kept 
silent, but sometimes he said "what we are dealing with here has to do with the 
Portuguese. We are [not] dealing with the Dutch and the Japanese. It is not 
appropriate for you to bring this up. If you look at the geography of the situation, 
Kupang and Dili are very close, as are West and East Timor. It is all part of one 
community, one brotherhood and one nation." When we replied, "It is the 
Portuguese not the Dutch who colonized us here," most teachers were never 
prepared to go to the bottom of it, or to dig very deeply. On the rare occasions 
when they did, they provided theoretical explanations that were not very 
practically grounded. Sometimes teachers would be so embarrassed that they 
would just leave the room. One teacher I remember, Ida Bagus, from Bali, had 
problems controlling his laughter. He used to constantly remind us saying, "don't 
burst into laughter, don't laugh!" One of my friends, who was extremely naughty, 
always provoked him by bursting into laughter, and then Ida Bagus would have 
to leave the room in order not to feel embarrassed before the whole class. 
(Interview with Martinho Maia Gonsalves, Lisbon, April 15, 1999)
The case of Ida Bagus struck us as interesting. We asked whether [Bagus's] 
particularly acute embarrassment was a sign that as a Balinese he felt differently about 
the official Indonesian line than did his Javanese colleagues—his uncontrollable 
laughter being a natural inner-island Indonesian way of hiding his sense of shame? 
"Actually no," Martinho replied, "most were the same and spun us the same story, but 
there was one teacher from Flores, a Catholic, I remember, who always took the trouble 
to talk to us. And he would say: 'Look, this international issue [of East Timor's 
political status] is not finished yet. It is still in the hands of the United Nations and is
25The Indonesians had risen against the Dutch during the 1603-1942 colonial period and in 1945-9 while 
the young Republic was fighting for its very existence.
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very far from having been resolved/ But he was a rare person, most were pretty stiff 
and unbending." (Interview with Martinho Maia Gonsalves, Lisbon, April 15,1999)
This reluctance to question the official line seems also to have been reflected in the 
attitudes of the Indonesian student body, most of whom were children of military or 
civil servant families. (By the 1990s, there were upwards of 21,500 troops in the 
territory—one for every thirty-eight inhabitants26—as well as some eight thousand 
police and 28,000 civil servants, including schoolteachers.) When Honorio de Araujo 
came to Dili in the mid-1990s to study at the Technical Middle School (Sekolah Teknik 
Menengah) in the staunchly pro-Fretilin suburb of Becora in the eastern part of the city, 
he noticed that:
If there was some political discussion, the school community usually divided into 
two groups—the Timorese and the Indonesians—rather than into various shades 
of Indonesians. If there was a showdown, it would always be East Timorese 
taking the side of other East Timorese against the "Javanese" [in this case not 
necessarily ethnic Javanese from Central and East Java, but any inner-island 
Indonesians27]. We played football together, went on picnics together, but we 
never invited the "Javanese" or Indonesians to our homes. That said, there was of 
course a greater degree of affinity between us with those from Nusa Tenggara 
Timur [NTT] than there was with those from other Indonesian islands. Most of 
the Indonesian children were children of civil servants and army officers. 
Therefore they really felt they had to support what their parents were doing. It 
was very rare to find a "Javanese" who took a different view. It was different, of 
course, with members of the Indonesian democratic opposition such as members 
of Megawati's PDI [Partai Demokrasi Indonesia], or with the PRD [Partai Rakyat 
Demokrasi], but it was on the whole difficult. But I do remember a boy from 
Aceh. He had a very different view and was following the situation [in East 
Timor] very very intensely. He said to me later, "East Timor must go first, but we 
will follow you: one day we will also demand our independence." He was 
extremely keen to observe events in East Timor and had a very close solidarity 
with us. (Interview with Honorio de Araujo, Lisbon, November 9,1999)
(iii) Turning Points
Honorio's experience with his young Acehnese friend points up the fact that certain 
encounters and events—often seemingly quite fortuitous—shaped the way in which 
members of the Indonesian-educated generation began to view the occupation. For 
some, these incidents marked the dawning of a new political awareness, a coming of 
age that changed their emotional and mental horizons for ever.
One of Honorio's Fataluku contemporaries in the Lospalos area was Aquiles 
Sequeira (born August 10, 1978). Brought up in a small hamlet in the sub-district of 
Lore near the south coast, he lived in a region where there were frequent encounters 
between Falintil and the Indonesian army. As was the custom amongst the local 
Fataluku population, where Catholicism had yet to penetrate very deeply, his father
26 Moore, "Indonesian Military's Last Years in East Timor," p. 25.
27 The term "Javanese" (Javaneses), along with the more common "Make" (Malay), is used in Tetum to 
denote any foreigner, in this case straight-haired people from Western Indonesia and the Malay peninsula.
46 Peter Carey
had married twice. Aquiles was the youngest child of the second wife. His mother's 
younger brother was staunchly pro-Fretilin and was fighting with the local Falintil units 
in the nearby forest. In the mid-1980s, Aquiles suddenly began to become aware of the 
situation:
"I did not know this at the time, but my mother was constantly sending food 
and provisions to her younger brother in the forest. I did not really know much 
about who Fretilin were, but I often went out to the family plot where we grew 
sweet potatoes, maize, dry-field padi, mangoes, and melons. It was there that I 
was asked on one occasion to go to find some Fretilin members and give them 
food. In the center of our plot of land was a small palapa [palm leaf] house where 
we used to retire after working in the fields and where we would prepare food in 
the traditional way and have our meal out in the open underneath this little 
shelter. It was there that, as a young boy, having been sent out by my mother, I 
had my first meeting with Fretilin fighters who were resting beside our hut. Up to 
that time I knew nothing about Fretilin. Indeed, I used to ask myself whether they 
were human beings or not. I knew that they were defending our country by 
fighting against the Indonesians, but this was the first time I was actually in 
contact with them.
"One of the figures who made the greatest impression on me was the local 
Fretilin company commander [in Iliomar], Armando Nolasco, whose nom-de- 
guerre was Koro Asu [died 1987]. He struck great fear into the Indonesians 
because he was so adept at mounting ambushes on ABRI patrols. The forests in 
his area were literally killing grounds. Indonesian territorial battalions entered 
there, and they were lucky to come back with half their numbers. There was one 
particular instance in which seventeen were killed all at once. If any of Koro 
Asu's lieutenants were killed, he was prepared to kill fifty to sixty in return. He 
was not like other commanders, who fought only during the late evening or 
nighttime. He was prepared to strike in broad daylight.
"I first saw Koro Asu with my own eyes at the time when Xanana entered 
into a brief ceasefire with the Indonesian commander, Colonel Gatot Purwanto, in 
March-August 1983.28 Koro Asu came down from the mountains with another 
Fretilin commander, Falo Chai [Fernando Teles, died 1985], to join in the 
negotiations. They even organized a football game between Fretilin and ABRI, 
with the Timorese allowing the Indonesians to win two-love. I was then nearly 
five years old. Koro Asu made a speech to the younger generation saying: 'Your 
struggle is not yet finished. You will continue this in the years to come.'"
"What happened after that?"
"In 1985-86, when I went up to Class Four of primary school, a change 
occurred in my life because I began to realize what was happening, and I began to 
think what should we do to rectify this situation. There was so much torture and 
so many victims. In 1989,1 went up to Junior High School [SMP] in Lospalos, and 
I began to understand what the score was and what was going on vis-a-vis 
Indonesia. In my times off school, I went back to my old village in Lore sub­
district. My older brother had by then been working for a long time with our 
brothers in the bush as a member of the clandestine movement. At that time the
28 See above, n. 21.
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number of Indonesian spies was increasing. Indonesian military intelligence 
[Satgas (Satuan Tugas) Intelijen, Intelligence Taskforce, SGI], was increasing its 
reach, and everyone who was working for Fretilin in the mountains was being 
searched for. I wanted to know how we could get out of this situation, how we 
would be able to fight for a free East Timor, to bring the truth of the situation to 
the outside world." (Interview with Aquiles Sequeira, Lisbon, April 10, 1999)
For the young Martinho Maia Gonsalves, growing up as a teenager in Dili in the 
mid-1980s, it was not so much one event as a gathering consciousness brought on by 
the stories told him by neighbors, friends, and family of what was really happening in 
the countryside and in the mountains that opened his eyes to the true nature of the 
occupation:
"I particularly remember we had a neighbor, an East Timorese, whose cousin 
was in the mountains fighting for Fretilin. He even showed us a photograph of 
him. It had been taken before he went up into the mountains to join Fretilin, but 
our neighbor told us what his cousin's experiences had been, how he had 
witnessed mass killings and the various incidents which had propelled him to 
take up arms and join the guerrillas in the mountains. But I don't think it was just 
my contact with this particular neighbor. I heard lots of things at this time [i.e., 
mid 1980s]. I heard about violations of women, of women being raped in front of 
their husbands, of brothers having to kill brothers under the gun barrels of the 
Indonesians. I became more and more angered, and when discussing these things 
[with my friends], the process of politicization began to take on its own dynamic. 
It was not something that happened suddenly, just like that ... it couldn't be 
ascribed to one event or particular incident. Rather it was a gathering 
consciousness."
"Can you clarify the sources of information for the rapes and the killings? 
Were they from friends, from school mates, or from other people?"
"Actually, it was from friends at school, [and] from family members who also 
had victims within the family. In fact, one of my uncles had joined Fretilin in the 
mountains in the 1975-79 period and had surrendered [following the fall of Mt. 
Matebian]. I heard a lot of stories from that source too. The information came 
from relatives and friends. There were all sorts of lines of communication, not just 
the one." (Interview with Martinho Maia Gonsalves, Lisbon, April 15,1999)
A rather similar process was experienced by Martinho's friend, Aviano Faria, a 
Dili resident of mixed Timorese-Chinese parentage. For him events much closer to hand 
in Dili itself, indeed in the street outside his own home, were sufficient to change his 
view of the occupation. The conclusion he drew was not just that resistance was 
necessary, but also that there was an urgent need for the moral uplift of the East 
Timorese people themselves, who were being debased daily by the occupation forces, a 
view remarkably similar to that which had inspired the Javanese pioneers of the zaman 
kebangkitan nasional ("national awakening era")29 in the early years of the twentieth 
century:
29 The beginning of the zaman kebangkitan nasional in Indonesia is usually dated to the foundation of Boedi 
Oetomo ("Noble Endeavour") organization by Dr. Wahidin Sudirohusodo (1857-1917), and Dr. Sutomo
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"What really made me afraid and acutely aware of what was happening in 
East Timor was not just what was being said or what was happening in school, 
but the actual environment in which we were living from day to day. We were 
always seeing Indonesian soldiers in full battle dress—and this was in the capital 
Dili. Even if they were in civilian dress, they would still carry their side arms with 
them. It thus seemed to be a pretty odd environment in which the Indonesians 
were going round armed to the teeth the whole time. Indeed, for me it brought on 
a sort of trauma. I mean the military were everywhere. I can remember a 
particular incident when a truck full of soldiers in battle dress careered round a 
corner and ran over a child in the middle of the road. Of course, when you have 
an incident like that the whole family comes out to see what was going on and to 
try and help their child. And the family obviously wanted to take on the soldiers 
and started making a fuss then and there. But the soldiers said to them—and I 
was still only eight or nine at the time—'don't you dare make any fuss about this; 
go and collect the remains of your child; take him home and bury him. If there is 
any protest from you lot, you will all be following your child to an early grave.' 
This was such a shocking experience for me and caused me to reflect that things 
were in no way settled [in East Timor] nor in any way in a normal state.
"And there was another incident where the army came to arrest someone 
whom they had accused of being involved in politics. He happened to be a 
neighbor of mine [in Balide]. And the Indonesians just marched straight into his 
house without a by-your-leave or anything. When they didn't find the person they 
were looking for, they started beating up his wife and family, whom they all took 
into custody. As children, we of course all went to see what was going on, and 
this was such a shocking experience because it just happened on our doorstep. It 
made me feel extremely bitter and revolted. I really wanted to find out the true 
facts of the situation [in East Timor], and of course I listened very intently to the 
Indonesian TV and radio, but I soon came to understand that I was not getting 
the true facts from the Indonesian TV and radio networks. So I began to tune in to 
foreign radio broadcasts, to Radio Netherlands, and Australian and Brazilian 
stations. The last was, of course, in Portuguese, which I could readily understand. 
Then I began to gather data from which I could construct a proper intellectual 
understanding of the situation, and on which I could actually base my own 
political attitudes. Thus the beginnings of my intellectual opposition to the 
Indonesians started to be grounded on real fact.
"One of the things that really made me aware of the situation was when I 
started hearing arguments amongst the East Timorese themselves. They always 
seemed to be coming to blows about the loss of their pigs, livestock, etc. If their 
children came to blows, the parents would also come out of their houses and 
start taking it out on the grown-ups in the other family. This really opened my 
eyes, because it seemed as though we were sinking to a level below that of 
animals. This decline in basic moral values seemed to me very serious. The fact 
that a child could just be run over in the street by the military and there was no 
apology or redress meant that we didn't even have the status of animals. I mean, 
if you ran over an animal outside someone's house, you would at least stop and
(1888-1938) and other young Javanese students at the Batavia Medical School (School tot Opleiding van 
Inlandsche Artsen, STOVIA) on May 20,1908. Its end point came with the Japanese Occupation (1942-45).
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go into that person's house and offer to pay for it, saying, 'Look, I am 
desperately sorry this happened, I inadvertently ran over your animal. Here, 
please accept some small compensation.' But for us, even that basic respect was 
denied. And I went to my father and said: 'Look, this situation is going on and 
we are being treated worse than animals. We've got to do something about it, 
otherwise we are just going to go down the drain.'
"I took the view that the only correct way forward was to keep totally silent 
in the face of the Indonesians. I mean, if you said anything to them it was totally 
counterproductive. So from that moment on, I was on the look out for ways in 
which I could use my skills in the clandestine movement."
"How old were you then?"
"Fourteen years old, at the junior high school [SMP]. The year was 1984." 
(Interview with Aviano Faria, Lisbon, November 5,1999)
While for some a more cumulative or gradual awakening may have been the norm, 
at least one of those interviewed indicated that he had been specifically encouraged by 
an older generation Timorese, a local policeman, to see the occupation through different 
eyes. Egas (born Dili, 1971), like Aviano, is of mixed Chinese-pribumi (native 
Timorese-Indonesian) parentage. His father, who had left the family home shortly after
Egas (born Dili, 1971). Lisbon, April 1999.
Copyright © The Leverhulme Trust (London) "Survivors Project."
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his son's birth, was a Cantonese building contractor with family in both China and 
Taiwan, and his mother was Indonesian: she had been brought up in Atambua in 
Indonesian West Timor, but her maternal family was from Roti. The pair had met at 
Balxbo, a market town close to the Indonesian border. Following his parents' break-up, 
Egas had been adopted by a close neighbor in the parish of Balide where his family 
lived. Thus he was brought up by a local East Timorese family and, despite his 
unusual background, saw himself as a Timorese rather than a peranakan (mixed blood 
Chinese-Indonesian), and identified with the local rather than the Indonesian 
community. A thoughtful and intense young man, Egas, like others we interviewed from 
the Indonesian-educated generation, later went on to play a significant role in the East 
Timorese student movement as a member of the Organization of Timorese Youth 
(Organizacao de Juventude de Timor Leste, OJETIL), the main rival to the older 
established Renetil. In 1983-4, when he was still at Indonesian primary school, one of 
his friends showed him a newspaper clipping about a conference at which Jose Ramos 
Horta, the East Timorese resistance's roving foreign spokesman (now the East 
Timorese Foreign Minister), had made a speech. As Egas explained:
That was really my first political awakening. I was also aware of arrests and 
interrogations in Dili, about a black Chevrolet which may have been used by 
Indonesian military intelligence [SGI] that went round at night picking people up. 
Things were certainly not as they should be [tidak heres] in Dili when I was 
growing up.
In 1986, 1 left primary school and went on to my junior high school [SMP]. 
One of the principal figures in terms of my dawning political awareness was a 
Timorese policeman who used to come round to the house. I didn't realize at the 
time that the policeman was in fact involved with the clandestine movement. 
From time to time, he would test us by throwing out questions like: "What is your 
view of the current situation?"; "Isn't the situation really quite unfair?"; "What 
do you think of the Indonesians?" He was sort of preparing the ground. Then I 
can remember on February 5,1986, after the policeman had played football with 
us, he began to talk to us directly about the situation in East Timor. That was the 
first major awakening for us.
After the February 5, 1986 conversation, I was brought into contact via my 
policeman friend with the clandestine movement. Contact was made with a 
group in Afleu, which used to be a major military base during the Portuguese 
colonial period and had been a great center of Fretilin support in the early years 
of the war [1975-77]. My policeman friend helped us to have discussions about 
culture, about how East Timorese culture was different from that of inner island 
Indonesia, particularly Java and Bali, and he also talked about the economic 
situation, saying that although East Timor was not hugely rich, it nonetheless had 
sufficient resources to support itself. He said the reason people were dirt poor 
was because of the exploitation of the Indonesians.
Through these topics of conversation—both economic and cultural—which he 
brought up, I began to get a clearer sense of what the real situation was in the 
country. In 1986-87,1 became involved in the underground resistance, and there 
were conversations and discussions about the two ways of going forward, 
namely, whether we should adopt the moderate route, or the more in-your-face, 
radical, and violent path. (Interview with Egas, Lisbon, April 8,1999)
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Martinho Maia Goncalves's, Aviano's, and Egas's very different experiences of 
political awakening can be usefully contrasted with that of Aviano's friend, Joao Dias, 
who was later to play such a crucial role as a witness to the military hospital killings 
which followed the November 12, 1991 Santa Cruz massacre. For Joao, it was the 
trauma of his father's death in 1984 after a period of prolonged torture at the hands of 
the Indonesian military that really shook him and brought him face-to-face with the 
realities of the Indonesian occupation. Again, this is the story of a Dili-based youngster 
who was still in the first year of Portuguese-language primary school when the 
Indonesians invaded in December 1975. Like Aviano, Joao came of age after going 
through the Indonesian school system in East Timor, although later he went to college
Joao Dias (born Dili, 1968). Lisbon, April 1999. 
Copyright © The Leverhulme Trust (London) 'Survivors Project'.
in Java. His father, who had served in the Portuguese colonial army (tropas) and had 
risen to the rank of corporal, did his best to get along with Timor's new colonial 
masters. However his former career in the tropas became a liability when this fact was 
incautiously divulged by his parish priest to a local Indonesian army officer:
"My father was ex-Portuguese army, as he had been a corporal in the tropas 
(Portuguese colonial troops). The local Indonesian lieutenant-colonel asked the 
priest what my father had done during the Portuguese colonial period, and the 
priest rather incautiously gave away that my father was a member of the 
Portuguese army. The colonel made a joke of it and said: 'Well, in that case he 
could maybe enter the Indonesian army!' My father replied: 'I am well over forty
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now and too old to contemplate a new military career/ That moment marked the 
time when my father started to be constantly interrogated. Luckily, we were 
staying with a priest [at] the time and the Indonesians did not dare arrest him. 
But one year later [1976], we went back to live in Becora. My father was forced 
to do guard duty at night to protect the local vegetable and fruit plots. They had 
to carry sharp knives to kill any Fretilin who tried to get food. My father did not 
want to do that duty. He said he did not want to kill other Timorese.
"From the moment when he started to refuse guard duty, the family began to 
have a really difficult time. My father was always being pulled in for questioning. 
We lived at the time in [various places] in Kuluhun, Becora, and the kampung 
[city neighborhood] of Becussi. In the afternoon, my father went out to our 
vegetable plot to get food. The Indonesian military [ABRI], however, used the 
opportunity to steal my mother's sewing machine and all our tins of food. My 
father started to argue with ABRI, telling them to desist from taking our 
belongings, but because they had guns and he did not it was all very difficult. It 
was a time of great provocations. This went on through the late 1970s and early 
1980s. Then in 1983, my father was arrested and did not come back. He went to 
the sub-district military [Koramil] headquarters, and we went to find him there, 
all eight of us. We were locked in the bathroom of the headquarters for a week 
and were given one small basket of rice a day. I had an important role to play 
because I had to translate my father's Tetum into Indonesian because my father 
couldn't speak Bahasa. The Indonesian interrogators used their military belts. 
Now one of these standard issue belts had a small buckle, but the other, which 
was used for carrying heavy military equipment, had a very heavy buckle on it. It 
was this they used to hit him over the head and in the abdomen. Maybe because 
the torture was happening in front of his own children, he did not wince, show 
pain, or move his head. In fact, he had a smile on his face. Nevertheless, the 
torture was very severe. Both his stomach and his head swelled up. There was no 
medicine for him. After seven days at the Koramil command post, we were 
allowed home. But no sooner had we been home a bare two days than at five 
o'clock in the morning we heard a knock on the front door. The Koramil command 
was asking my father to return. My mother said, 'Look, my husband can't walk. 
Why don't you allow us to remain at home where we can find him some goat or 
chicken and try to get him into a slightly stronger state?' But the Koramil refused 
to listen. They wanted us all to come. But when we turned up without my father, 
they sent the seven of us to the Kodim, the district military office. The Kodim 
commander said, 'You've just [got] to go home and make sure that all of you turn 
up!' My mother said to me, 'Joao, let us go to see Father [Alberto] Ricardo [a 
well-known Timorese priest who was then in charge of the Motael parish]. Maybe 
he can talk some sense into him.' So Father Ricardo came with us to the East 
Timor regional command [Korem] headquarters. At the time the commander-in- 
chief [panglima] of the Indonesian army, General Leonardus Benyamin ['Benny'] 
Murdani [in office, 1983-88] was there. Father Ricardo tried to reason with the 
Indonesian military. A huge number of phone calls were made to the Koramil and 
Kodim, and eventually they made us a declaratory letter [serat pernyataan], and 
we were all told to go. They said they wanted to send us all to prison, maybe to 
the small offshore island of Atauro where all the political prisoners were sent. In 
fact, my father died just a few days later [March 15, 1984]. He died almost as
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soon as he reached the hospital. The Indonesian military authorities made a joke 
of our misfortune: 'Since the Portuguese were so good to you, they are going to 
send food, medicines, and everything else you need when you are in Atauro.' But 
we knew the situation in Atauro was very grave for the people detained there, 
and many prisoners, especially the very young and very old, were dying. It was a 
dry, volcanic island, and there was no water. In fact, my mother reflected, 'They 
wouldn't even have got us to Atauro anyway. They would just have pushed us 
overboard as we were making the crossing.' So she was determined we wouldn't 
leave."
"Was that the turning point in your life; your father's death in such tragic and 
terrible circumstances?"
"Yes, I felt very bitter indeed against those who had tortured my father. But 
as life went on in the 1980s, I began to see that as part of history, part of my own 
family history. But on November 12, 1991 came the Santa Cruz massacre, and 
that reawakened with redoubled force all my old feelings of bitterness." 
(Interview with Joao Dias, Lisbon, April 10,1999)
We will return to Joao's testimony shortly, but now we must consider the responses 
of the "new" generation to this grievous situation: how did those Indonesian-educated 
and mainly Dili-based East Timorese survive? How did they manage to keep up 
appearances with their Indonesian neighbors, while deepening their clandestine 
resistance activities? The answers to these questions lie in the differing strategies they 
adopted, strategies which cover a range of tactics from outright confrontation to more 
or less ingenious forms of deception and subterfuge.
(iv) Sleeping with the Enemy
For the hot-headed Egas, direct confrontation was the answer. Together with some 
school friends, he decided to single out the most vulnerable amongst the Indonesian 
newcomer population, namely civilian professionals serving the Indonesian 
transmigrant community, of which perhaps as many as 100,000 (both official and 
unofficial) eventually had made their way to the territory in the course of the 1980s 
and 1990s.30 As we have seen from Martinho Maia Gonsalves's testimony, their
30 For figures on the numbers of Indonesian transmigrants in this period, see Kieman," Demography of 
Genocide in Southeast Asia," citing Soewartoyo, "Migrasi Internal di Timor Timur: Kajian di daerah 
tujuan pasca intergrasi," Analisis CSIS, tahun 26 no. 3 (May-June 1997), pp. 265-75; and Frederic Durand, 
Timor Loro Sae: pays au carrefour de I'Asie (Bangkok: IRASEC, 2002), p. 87. According to Kiernan, citing 
John Taylor, EastTimor: The Price o f Freedom (London: Zed Books, 1999), p. 124, and Defert, Ginocide 
Oublie, p. 182, the first officially sponsored transmigrants from Java and Bali (fifty out of an ultimate total 
of five hundred families, according to Taylor, six hundred families according to Defert) arrived in 1980, and 
most were sent to the fertile Maliana plain in the northwestern part of East Timor close to the frontier with 
West Timor. According to Defert, by 1984, some five thousand Balinese "model farmers"(petani teladan) had 
been settled across the territory, again most going to the western districts of Suai, Bobonaro, and Maliana, 
where some intermarried with the local population and would have stayed on after the August 30,1999 
independence referendum, but for the actions of the Indonesian military and pro-integrationist militias. 
Soewartoyo gives a total of 14,142 transmigrants for the period 1980-85, and a further 15,550 in 1986-88. 
After subtracting return and outward migration, which became easier after the official "opening" of East 
Timor in January 1989, Soewartoyo counts a figure of 33,618 "lifetime" transmigrants by 1990. This figure, 
however, does not take account of the large number of "unofficial" or self-directed transmigrants, 
particularly Bugis, Butonese, and Makasarese from South Sulawesi, who began to arrive in East Timor in 
ever larger numbers following the January 1989 "opening." Taking these unofficial arrivals into account,
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presence had changed the character of Dili from a predominantly Timorese to an 
Indonesian town:
In 1986-87, I was drawn towards the more confrontational stance. I can 
remember an incident in Becora in 1988 in which I attacked an Indonesian doctor 
in his surgery. The doctor and eight of his [Indonesian] patients were assaulted. 
Eight of my group were taken in for questioning; five were released and three 
brought before an examining magistrate. Two of these were released for being 
drunk and disorderly. One was imprisoned for a time. When he got out, he joined 
the resistance. I look back on this assault on the Indonesian doctor with a certain 
sense of shame because I feel that he was just carrying out his professional duties. 
However, there was a strong sense of antagonism at this time against Indonesian 
transmigrants. Even though they were innocent victims of the situation, they were 
nonetheless part and parcel of the Indonesian colonial occupation of East Timor. 
(Interview with Egas, Lisbon, April 8,1999)
For young East Timorese women like Ana Maria Vitor ("Nina"), whose family were 
strong Fretilin supporters, the attitude adopted was less one of direct confrontation 
than an overt form of passive resistance. In part, this was due to her sex and the need 
to protect herself against the unwanted attentions of her Indonesian army neighbors in 
the Becora area. She explained:
"We had Indonesian neighbors in Dili, Indonesians serving in the military. They 
used to come round to our house from time to time to shoot the breeze and engage 
us in conversation. When they came round, they would come to the front of the 
house and sit down, and we would all go out to the back. So they would be 
sitting in the front alone. No one would serve them any food or drink. Then 
gradually the penny would drop, and they would realize that they were not 
wanted there. Partly, we didn't want to speak with them because they always 
wanted to speak with the girls, and we soon realized that they had an ulterior 
motive."
"Did your parents encourage you to give them the cold shoulder?"
"No, it came entirely from ourselves. Even in junior [SMP] and senior [SMA] 
high school, the East Timorese and Indonesian students were both going their 
separate ways. We began to have separate groups at school both amongst our 
peer groups and friends." (Interview with Ana Maria Vitor, Alvalade, Lisbon, 
April 14, 1999)
For most young East Timorese males involved in the clandestine movement, such an 
overt form of resistance was deemed inappropriate because it would have aroused
Frederic Durand estimates a figure of 85,000 by 1990, whereas the Italian Jesuit priest, Mauro di Nicola, in 
"East Timor—The Springs of Social Justice," Uniya Newsletter (Jesuit Social Justice Centre, Sydney) (Spring 
1995), gives the much higher figure of 180,000 (out of a total population of 830,000) for the mid-1990s, a 
figure that must include the families of officials and military and police personnel. For a rather lower 
estimate (814,000) of the total population of East Timor at this time, see UN General Assembly, "East 
Timor," Working Paper prepared by the Special Committee on Decolonisation, June 17,1996 (A/ AC, 
109/2049), 2, para 1; and for figures on the number of transmigrants in April 1997 (161,095 in the 15-60 
age group in a total population of 867,000), see the statistics supplied by Dr. Armindo Maia, Vice-Rector of 
the Universitas Timor Timur, during a visit by the present author to East Timor in April 1997, cited in 
Carey, "Personal Journey through East Timor," pp. 26, 30, n. 25.
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Indonesian suspicions. As noted above, Aviano Faria (born Dili, 1970) was the child 
of mixed blood Chinese-East Timorese parentage, who later survived the Santa Cruz 
(Dili) massacre (November 12,1991). Earlier, I mentioned his view that silence was the 
golden rule when it came to dealing with the Indonesians, and that he needed to find 
other, more subtle, means to resist. During that interview, we invited him to expand on 
his remark, asking him if he meant a form of "spiritual resistance," the sort that some 
pro-Free French showed the occupying Germans in Paris, when it was common to see 
people walking down the Champs Elysees with two staves (deux gaules) in hand to 
remind everyone of the existence of Charles de Gaulle, the head of the Free French 
Government in London? Or, did he mean something more overt, like Ana Maria Vitor's 
never speaking to Indonesians unless spoken to, or answering in monosyllabic words, 
so the Indonesians would know they were not wanted? He answered:
No! The form of resistance we used was quite different from that. It was the 
sort that must never be noticed by the Indonesian military. We were always trying 
to get close to the Indonesians. We gave them all sorts of things to eat and drink. 
We invited them to festivals and to parties. In the Balide area where I lived in 
Dili, there were a lot of Indonesian professional and business people, and they 
had children. We got close to those children, and they mixed with us quite freely, 
and we were always asking them to our house, and we treated them like an elder 
to younger brother. We also invited members of the Indonesian army to play 
football and volleyball, so they would be lulled into a false sense of security, 
lulled into a sense that we had really accepted them, and we were like their own 
children. This was the way we lived amongst the Indonesians in a sort of double 
life: [taking] an outward apparent pleasure in their company and deepening [our] 
inner resistance. This was how things worked in a situation of complete 
domination. If we wanted to hold a meeting amongst our own group, what we 
would often do, if it was difficult to hold that meeting in private, would be to 
throw a party to which the Indonesians would be invited. In the midst of the 
party, while the Indonesians were dancing in the marquee outside in the garden, 
or drinking beer, we would gather in a room in the house surrounded by beer 
bottles. Speaking in Tetum Dili or Tetum Terik [an archaic form of Tetum used by 
some East Timorese communities mainly in the south of the country], we would 
discuss our own business while the party was in full swing. We would tell the 
Indonesians: "This is a party for you; this is a party for our ABRI brothers—make 
sure that security is tight so that nobody comes here to disturb us!"
This was a way of getting round the problem of actually holding meetings, 
because obviously, if one held a meeting in private with a lot of young people 
coming together, that would arouse a lot of suspicion amongst the Indonesians. 
But if the meeting was held as though it was a party in the midst of a larger 
party, and there were lots of young people getting together, then that would be 
seen as normal. No suspicions would be aroused, and we could actually share 
what we wanted to talk about together. We might discuss politics, we might 
discuss our family situations, or we might share snippets of information. And all 
this could be done under the very noses of the Indonesians, without in any way 
arousing their suspicions.
There were those who took the view that there should be a more outright form 
of confrontation and who behaved more radically. They took on their teachers at
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school and started contradicting them. But we also succeeded in bringing these 
people around to our way of thinking. In my view, the path of confrontation was 
bom of frustration. Some of their fathers had lost their jobs, and many had a very 
difficult situation at home. But we brought them round eventually to our way of 
thinking , which said that maybe the best way forward is to put up this 
pretended front to the Indonesians. (Interview with Aviano Faria, Lisbon, 
November 5, 1999)
The practical advantages of such a policy of ostensible friendship and acceptance 
are nicely illustrated by two contrasting testimonies from the 1990s, one by Joao Dias, 
who was working then for the Indonesian Army as a lab technician in the military 
hospital in Dili, and the other by Ejfdio Dias Quintas, both of whom we have heard 
from above.
Joao witnessed the killings, which came to be known as the "second massacre,"31 
immediately following the November 12, 1991 Santa Cruz bloodbath. Indeed, he 
explains how he intentionally maneuvered himself into a situation where he could use 
his professional position at the Dili military hospital to document and perhaps 
prevent some of the more underhand murders being carried out by the Indonesians on 
the hospital premises. Rather like Aviano and his friends, he feigned loyalty to and 
friendship with the Indonesians. This involved making a very public show of 
commitment to both his professional duties and the hospital where he served, in order 
to convince his Indonesian medical colleagues that he was the genuine article, a "new" 
generation Timorese who had assimilated Indonesian values:
I was at school at that time [in 1984 when my father was killed]: I hadn't 
graduated from high school [SMA], so I worked my way through school by selling 
things on the street. I sold fried bananas, singkong [cassava], and cakes. 
Sometimes I was just so hungry that I ate everything there was on the plate I was 
selling from, and when I came back my mother was always cross with me, and 
gave me a hard time. Sometimes I bought bottles of drinks and sold them at a 
higher price. Sometimes I just sold ordinary dried firewood. [With the small 
income this brought me], I was able to work my way through high school, and 
eventually I went to Madiun in East Java to study at the Military Technical 
Analysis School [Sekolah Analisa Teknik Militer], Since they paid my salary, they 
expected me to work for them, which indeed I did, until I eventually left East 
Timor in December 1993.1 was not just any ordinary young official or student at 
school, and later in my work at the Wira Husada no. 4 Military Hospital, I 
thought a lot about how I could stop them killing people. I planted flowers in 
front of the hospital, and turned up to water them [every day]. When the 
Indonesian doctors and the other clinical staff saw that, they said: "Joao, you 
really love this hospital don't you?" This gave me a special entree. The 
Indonesian staff thought I was quite special, but in fact I had a secret agenda. I 
wanted to see when they brought in grievously wounded Falintil soldiers, and get 
their names so that I could send these to Amnesty International or to the Legal 
Aid Foundation [Lembaga Bantu Hukum, LBH] in Jakarta to make sure that
31 On this second massacre, see Max Stahl, "Indonesians fed 'Death Pills' to Wounded," Sunday Times 
(February 13, 1994).
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when the Indonesians tortured them they were not going to be killed. We knew 
only too well what usually happened to wounded Falintil members. Indeed, we 
only have to recall what happened to the commandant of the Falintil Second 
Sector in Baucau, David Alex [David da Costa], who was wounded in a gun 
battle in Baucau [June 25, 1997], and died later that day [following extensive 
torture by SGI], after he had been taken by military helicopter to the Wira 
Husada hospital in Dili.32 So in fact I had a secret role. I was there in the hospital 
as a secret witness. I was not there just as any other ordinary young person 
working as a lab technician. I was there in a special role. On November 12, 1991, 
came the Santa Cruz massacre, and that reawakened with redoubled force all my 
old feelings of bitterness. I was forced to take part in a second massacre that 
involved the poisoning and killing of my friends who were brought into the 
military hospital, and were drugged to death [with formaldehyde pills] by the 
Indonesian authorities. I felt strongly enough about this to tell the filmmaker Max 
Stahl, [who shot the video footage of the Santa Cruz massacre later shown in 
numerous TV news broadcasts, films, and reports on East Timor].33 I also sent 
news of what I had witnessed to the offices of the Legal Aid Foundation, as well 
as to Holland and the outside world. Max said he wanted to publish this [and] 
tell the whole world about the second massacre. He said, "Look, if you are going 
to tell the world about this, your life will not be secure here in Timor. Please try to 
get out. I suggest you go to Geneva to tell the UN Human Rights Commission 
[UNHRC] what has happened." I asked my mother what I should do, and she 
said: "I would prefer to have a son who is still alive but far from me than a son 
who is dead by my side." So I got out and went to Geneva, Canada, and Japan to 
testify. That was the way I saw that I would be able to continue to support our 
struggle. (Interview with Joao Dias, Lisbon, April 10,1999)
Joao's older contemporary, Domingos Sarmento Alves, who had arrived in Dili 
from Viqueque in July 1981, also saw an opportunity to deepen his commitment to the 
clandestine movement while pretending to be a fully assimilated "new generation" 
Timorese. As he told us:
In 1984, there was an announcement from the Indonesian government in Dili 
that every student who got through their senior high school [SMA] graduation 
exams would get a guaranteed place in an inner-island Indonesian university. So 
we had a chink of light here. We began to meet in discussion groups amongst 
friends at the SMA to encourage each other to study hard, so that we could go on 
to university. In 1986, we founded a sort of study group. We began to vie with
32 David Alex Daitula (1950-97), the son of a liurai family in Baucau and charismatic commander of the 
Falintil Second Military District, was captured following a gun battle with Indonesian special forces in 
Baucau at 2.30 am on lune 25,1997. He sustained wounds in his arm and right leg which prevented him 
escaping. He was taken by Kopassus to the SGI "Red House" (Gedung Merah) interrogation center in 
Baucau, where he appears to have been extensively tortured. He died in hospital during the night of June 
25/26 after having been flown by military helicopter to Dili and was buried in secret at Bidau-Santana 
cemetery at 8.30 the following morning without any of his family being informed or allowed to see his body. 
See Amnesty International (London), "Report: David Alex was Shot in Battle," July 1 1997. See also, 
"Guerrilla Leader Put to Death," Tapol Bulletin 142 (July 1997): 17-18.
33 Broadcast by Yorkshire TV (January 71992) in the documentary by Peter Gordon, "In Cold Blood: The 
Massacre of East Timor."
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our Javanese and other inner-island Indonesian classmates academically. As it 
turned out, 98 percent of my SMA year group got through their exams, and many 
were able to go on to university. It was then that I developed a sort of plan. I was 
aware that the Indonesians aimed to send the brightest and best East Timorese 
out to Java and Bali for tertiary education. This would facilitate integration and 
inculcate in us a sense of racial, cultural, and educational identity with the 
Indonesians. We saw straight through this, but decided that we would go to Java 
and Bali anyway to turn the Indonesian strategy on its head by actually engaging 
with younger generation Indonesians. While the Indonesian government hoped 
that we would return from our studies feeling like Indonesians, we decided we 
would begin to educate our fellow Indonesian students about what was going on 
in East Timor.
It was partly because of this that we founded Renetil, the East Timorese 
Students' National Resistance organization, in 1988. We wanted to prevent the 
isolation of East Timorese students in the economic, cultural, and political 
spheres. We also tried to use the facilities that the Indonesians gave us to support 
the struggle in East Timor. Ten percent of our scholarship money was put into a 
Renetil fund, and we used this to buy food, clothes, medicines, and other 
necessities for the resistance, and to send information about the struggle outside 
the country. So we were essentially part of the clandestine front. Every major 
town and city in Java and Bali where there was a university had a Renetil office, 
and we contacted every Timorese student who came out to inner-island Indonesia 
to join our organization. In fact, every Renetil member had a task. We had a 
political research and analysis department to investigate trends in world opinion 
following the end of the Cold War, and we also had a propaganda department to 
get through to Indonesian students on campus. We had a big job here countering 
official Indonesian propaganda that East Timor was a backward Portuguese 
colony that they had gone [on] to develop; and that there were no human rights 
abuses. We tried shock tactics. If an Indonesian student asked us: "What do you 
eat in East Timor? Do you eat rice?" we would reply "No, we eat bullets there!" 
We would then start a conversation about the various types of oppression we 
suffered. We talked frankly about what was going on, bringing out photos, 
cassettes, letters, and other writings. We made contact with the university 
senates and debated the situation saying, "Our struggle is with Suharto, not the 
Indonesian people. It is a struggle like yours against the Dutch in the 1920s and 
1930s. Moreover, at least ten thousand Indonesian soldiers have perished in East 
Timor since the December 1975 invasion. It is a huge drain on your resources." In 
this way, we made every effort to get through to Indonesian intellectuals and tell 
them what was going on. We even gave some of these people Tetum code names: 
Dr. George Aditjondro of the Christian University in Salatiga [Universitas Satya 
Wacana], for example, was known as "Railakan" [lightning flash]. (Interview 
with Domingos Sarmento Alves, Lisbon, November 13,1999)
By the 1990s, especially after the international outcry over the November 12, 1991 
Santa Cruz massacre, this policy began to pay off in terms of support from radical 
Indonesian student groups such as Infight, which were themselves campaigning for an
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end to the Suharto dictatorship and political reform (reformasi) in Indonesia.34 
Increasing numbers of pro-democracy activists in these groups started to realize that 
the struggle for reformasi in Indonesia proper and the resolution of the East Timor 
problem were closely linked. They would also later acknowledge the part played by the 
East Timor issue in bringing about the fall of Suharto in May 1998. By this time, 
Renetil's strategy of engaging with Indonesian students had helped spawn several new 
solidarity organizations, including SMIT (Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia Timor, 
Indonesia-Timor Student Solidarity), an offshoot of the radical PRD, Fortilos (Forum 
Timor Loro Sae, East Timor Forum), successor to an organization set up to help East 
Timorese facing trial after the Santa Cruz massacre, and Solidamor (Solidaritas 
Mahasiswa untuk Penyelesaian Damai Timor Timur, Student Solidarity Organization 
for a Peaceful Settlement in East Timor), which campaigned for self-determination in 
East Timor and a peaceful end to the conflict.35 Renetil was also remarkably successful 
in getting information about what was happening in Timor out of the territory; the 
Australian lawyer, Robert Domm's, interview with Xanana Gusmao in his mountain 
base near Ainaro in September 1990 being perhaps its greatest coup.36
Unlike Domingos, Joao, and the others whose testimony we have heard in this 
section, Ejfdio was not a Dili resident or a graduate of an inner-island Indonesian 
university, but came to the Timorese capital after finishing his administration and 
bookkeeping course in Lospalos. This was some two years after Joao and Aviano 
(himself a Santa Cruz victim) had fled East Timor for Portugal (December 1993), and a 
year after Domingos had organized the highly successful sit-in by twenty-nine East 
Timorese protesters at the US Embassy in Jakarta at the time of the November 1994 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit that resulted in his own exile in 
Portugal.37 By this time, the situation in Dili had stabilized somewhat, and there were 
good work opportunities available. Ejfdio came to Dili to take up a job in a Surakarta- 
based transport company, PT Wiracita, which had offices in that city, all the while 
continuing his support for the Falintil fighters in the mountains:
I was working at that time for the resistance and my duties were to provide a link 
with the estafeta which provided communications and supplies to the Falintil 
units in the mountains. I worked in the PT Wiracita transport office; they gave me
34 These Indonesian pro-democracy groups played a significant role following the Santa Cruz massacre in 
organizing the public demonstration on November 19,1991 in Jakarta during which seventy—mostly 
Indonesian — demonstrators were arrested. See Jonathan Thatcher, "East Timor Protesters Detained in 
Indonesian Capital," Reuters (Jakarta), November 19,1991; and personal communication, Liem Soei Liong, 
August 12, 2003.
35 See the report on the May 12-14,2000 East Timor international solidarity groups meeting in Utrecht in 
"International Meeting on East Timor," Tapol Bulletin 158 (June 2000): 15.
36 For a detailed description of Robert Domm's visit, see Pinto and Jardine, Unfinished Struggle, pp. 126-34. 
Domm's interview was broadcast by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) Radio National on 
October 28, 29, and 30,1990 under the title "Report from the Mountains of East Timor: Interview with 
Resistance Guerrilla Commander, Shanana [sic] Gusmao."
37 On the November 12-23,1994 US embassy sit-in, see "Timor's Opportunity," The Economist (London), 
November 19, 1994, p. 80; Brian Bain, "Clinton Threatens Suharto over Rights," The Independent (London), 
November 17,1994; and "East Timor Youths to Accept Asylum," International Herald Tribune (Paris), 
November 23,1994. All twenty-nine East Timorese protestors were eventually given political asylum in 
Portugal.
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a motorbike, and also a house in Dili, where I also hid one of the guerrilla 
commanders, Commandante Riak. I went around everywhere between Lospalos 
and Ermera, which was where the Falintil supreme commander, [Nino] Konis 
Santana [1959-98], was operating at the time. My fate was good. I was able to 
carry out my duties without ever being arrested, or tortured, or in other ways 
bothered by the Indonesians. I was able to carry letters for the guerrillas; going 
back to my home village from time to time, and using the house in Dili, where 
Commandante Riak was hiding, to make many contacts, to meet people, and to 
get information out to foreign journalists while they were visiting Dili. We knew 
we would soon be free. At that time, I was a friend of a certain Indonesian 
lieutenant, Murdani, from Infantry Battalion 527, an East Javanese battalion. He 
often came to my house. I did it on purpose [cultivating this friendship] so that 
the Indonesians would have no suspicions about me, and so that Lt. Murdani 
would himself not suspect anything. He often came to hang out at my house; to 
drink, smoke, and relax. And all the while Commandante Riak was in another 
room in the house, but the Indonesian lieutenant never knew that there was a 
guerrilla commander right there under his nose in the very same building! 
(Interview with Ejidio Dias Quintas, Lisbon, November 9,1999)
By the time Ejidio was working in Dili on behalf of the resistance in 1995-97, it 
was clear to him that the days of the Indonesian occupation were numbered:
People were becoming more and more bold in terms of the actions they were 
taking. They were becoming bolder too in facing down the Indonesian army. There 
were lots and lots of difficulties being made for the Indonesian transmigrants, 
and we knew from the way things were going that the occupation was not for 
very much longer. Our purpose was to get world attention about what was going 
on in East Timor, which meant getting information out to journalists, or to anyone 
else who was visiting. We were not against the Indonesian people per se; we were 
essentially fighting to be a self-standing and independent country. We were not 
fighting the Indonesian people. The Indonesians were just ordinary people like 
ourselves. We did not accept the Indonesian regime, but we were not against the 
ordinary people of Indonesia. (Interview with Ejidio Dias Quintas, Lisbon, 
November 9, 1999)
Although Ejidio himself had to flee East Timor in February 1997, eventually seeking 
asylum in Portugal after entering the French embassy in Jakarta, his feeling that the 
occupation did not have long to run was soon to be borne out by events in Indonesia. 
During the next two years (1998-99), following the fall of Suharto on May 21, 1998, 
his successor, the mercurial Ir B. J . Habibie (in office, 1998-99) offered in quick 
succession promises of wider autonomy (June 9, 1998), and then of a referendum on 
Timor's political future, including the choice of separation from Indonesia ("berpisah 
dengan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia") (January 27, 1999). Eventually, on August 
30, 1999, the Timorese people themselves cast their brave and overwhelming vote for 
independence in the face of TNI-inspired militia violence that ultimately laid waste the 
whole territory and displaced two-thirds of the population before the September 20, 
1999 arrival of the Australian-led International Force in East Timor (InterFET).
Throughout this period, many of the Indonesian-educated "new" generation 
activists and students (850 from universities in Java, Bali, Lombok, and Lampung
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alone) left their studies to return to East Timor, at Xanana Gusmao's urging, to help 
prepare the population for the referendum. The same happened in East Timor itself, 
where students from the University of Timor Timur (UNTIM) and the Polytechnic in 
Hera (just to the east of Dili) threw themselves enthusiastically into the campaign, 
some paying with their lives at the hands of the Indonesian military and pro-autonomy 
militias. An umbrella organization, the Presidium Juventude Loriku Ass'wain Timor 
Loro Sa'e (The Youth Presidium of the Parakeet Warriors of Timor Loro Sae), which 
formed under the aegis of the National Council of East Timorese Resistance (CNRT) to 
unify all the youth movements in East Timor, also facilitated cooperation amongst the 
various student and youth organizations (Ojetil, Renetil, etc.) ahead of the vote.38 Thus 
the role played by the younger generation in ensuring the success of the referendum was 
significant, and reflected the survival skills learned by them under the uniquely 
challenging conditions of the occupation.
Conclusions
The forging of a "new" generation in the fires of the occupation is one of the most 
significant developments of the Indonesian period. The educational, linguistic, and 
political experience of the years 1975-99 produced a cohort of East Timorese, now in 
their late twenties and thirties, who were able to make a significant contribution to the 
independence struggle. The emergence of the urban-based clandestine movement, 
particularly in Dili, in the late 1980s was heavily dependent on their skills. Their 
knowledge of Indonesia, its language, and its institutions (particularly the modus 
operandi of its army and police force) far surpassed that of their Portuguese-educated 
seniors, ending for good the Salazarist-imposed isolation or “fado-style tragedy" (fado, 
fateful), as Jose Ramos Horta put it.39
During these twenty-four years, Timorese society changed profoundly. The 
colonially distorting images of Indonesia as a place of "Chinese" misters (tuan) and 
Atambua-based border crossers were replaced by a more realistic vision of the country. 
Although Indonesian poverty, brutality, and backwardness may have been confirmed 
following the December 1975 invasion, sheer survival during the occupation 
necessitated a much keener understanding of the way in which Indonesians thought 
and operated. Members of the "new" Indonesian-schooled generation acquired this 
knowledge, often through bitter experience, and learned how to live alongside the 
Indonesians in seeming acceptance of their rule, while disguising their own support for 
the resistance. The Santa Cruz massacre of November 12,1991 may have stripped this 
fiction bare, but almost to the last many senior Indonesian generals and intelligence 
officers remained convinced that a pro-integration vote could be secured, evincing a
38 See De Araiijo, "CNRT Campaign," pp. 106-25, esp. p. 112.
39 See Horta, Funu, p. 45. "Fado" from the Latin fatum (fate), in modem Portuguese has the meaning of 
"destiny one cannot avoid" or "yearning for things lost," in particular lost or unrequited love. In Lisbon, it 
is especially associated with a form of blues-style vocal music set in the slow modinha mode and played on 
the guitar or Portuguese mandolin, which was brought back to Portugal from Brazil in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. A lament for the tragedy of life and of things past and gone, it epitomizes all the 
melancholy— some would say, lugubriousness—of the Portuguese soul and of the country's faded colonial 
glory. Its greatest recent exponent was Amalia Rodrigues (1920-99), the so-called "queen of fado," who 
made a brief visit to East Timor to entertain the Portuguese colonial garrison in the early 1970s.
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woeful ignorance of the true feelings of the Timorese population.40 The strategy of the 
younger generation in lulling the Indonesians into a false sense of security—for 
example, through participating in the June 7, 1999 Indonesian general 
elections—contributed critically here. At the same time, their successful cultivation of 
sympathetic pro-democracy student groups in Indonesia assured them solidarity 
during the crucial transition years of the mid- to late 1990s, when Indonesia passed 
with surprising speed from Suhartoist autocracy to the false dawn of democracy and 
reformasi under interim Presidents B. J. Habibie (1998-99) and Aburrahman Wahid 
(1999-2001). The brief window of political opportunity that swung open at this time 
(and closed all too soon after the accession of Megawati Sukarnoputri in July 2001) 
gave East Timor its chance of freedom, a chance seized in part by the geragao foun and 
their skillful pre-referendum campaign in April-August 1999.
Partial though they are, the oral testimonies of the "new" generation exiles in 
Lisbon in the late 1990s point to a clear pattern of gathering political awareness 
beginning in junior high school (SMP) and continuing on through senior high school 
(SMA) and university. Compulsory courses in Indonesian national history and the 
1945 Constitution taught by inner-island Indonesian schoolmasters, who had difficulty 
disguising their sense of embarrassment at questions on Timor's different experience of 
colonial rule, sharpened political convictions favoring separateness. What formal 
Indonesian schooling left unfinished, the education of the street completed, with 
members of the geragao foun undergoing a crash course in survival in a Timor in which 
the rule of law was enforced through the barrels of Indonesian guns. The ability to think 
quickly and know the strengths and weaknesses of their new Malae (foreign) masters 
often meant the difference between life and death. Lessons learned under these 
conditions are not easily forgotten. In present-day Timor Loro Sa'e, the legacy of this 
generation of occupation survivors is perhaps the country's most precious resource. But 
what honor will they have in a nation where the Portuguese-educated 1975 generation 
still seem to call the shots?
Postscript
On December 3, 2002, the violent arrest of a twenty-year-old secondary school 
student by the East Timorese National Police (Polfcia Nacional de Timor-Leste, PNTL) 
in the midst of a school examination sparked protests by his fellow students and 
teachers. The following day, the level of violence escalated as the students were joined 
by other protesters, who began to gather around key buildings in the center of Dili, 
including the parliament, government offices, and the UN Police headquarters. Ehuing 
the following hours, hundreds of rounds of live ammunition were fired into the crowd
40 See Moore, "Indonesian Military's Last Years in East Timor," pp. 30, 34, quoting General Feisal 
Tanjung, then Coordinating Minister on Politics and Security in President Habibie's (in office, 1998-99) 
government. As late as June 1999, some were still reporting that some 75 percent of the East Timorese were 
in favor of integration with Indonesia, and that only a handful of anak nakal (naughty children) amongst the 
Indonesian-educated Timorese students were causing problems. The fact that over a third of the 400,000- 
strong Timorese electorate participated in the June 7,1999 general election, casting a 47 percent vote for the 
government's Golkar party and 35 percent for Megawati's PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, 
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), certainly helped to keep the fiction of widespread pro- 
integrationist sentiment amongst the wider East Timorese population alive.
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by the police, mostly by members of the newly formed and inexperienced Rapid 
Intervention Unit (RIU). A secondary school student was shot and killed outside the 
National University (Universidade Timor-Leste) opposite the parliament building, and 
three others were injured. Later in the morning, another youth was killed and six more 
wounded as the RIU fired on fleeing protesters in the Colmera area just to the west of 
the town center. Throughout the day, as the center of Dili was turned into a free fire 
zone, protesters moved between various parts of the city burning buildings and looting. 
Amongst the places attacked were Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri's Kompong Alor 
residence and that of his brother (both buildings were burnt to the ground). The Dili 
mosque and several foreign-owned businesses, including the Australian-owned 
downtown supermarket "Hello Mister," were similarly targeted, some being set on fire; 
others were looted. Eyewitnesses reported that the crowd was being directed on the 
ground by individuals seen riding ahead on motorbikes. Some even spoke of influential 
figures fanning tensions by making provocative speeches scorning the PNTL. The 
selection of sites was thought to be intentional, reflecting "new" generation discontent 
with the prime minister and his close political allies, as well as the economic influence 
of foreigners, especially Australians. Some seventy-seven people were arrested that 
day, and twenty-eight more on December 5, the majority of whom were not involved in 
the violence, but were innocent bystanders, including children making their way home 
from school. In the highly charged atmosphere of the Dili police headquarters, 
witnesses saw PNTL officers hitting and punching detainees as they were brought in 
for questioning. All but nine were released during the following three days, and a 
semblance of calm was restored.41
What can we make of this bloody event, the worst in East Timor's history since the 
immediate post-August 30, 1999 referendum violence? Might this be excused as part of 
the inevitable trials of a newly independent state, a country still living with the 
consequences of the Indonesian occupation—dirt poor, partially fledged, and 
administratively inexperienced? Perhaps. But it also may reflect a deeper social 
malaise. With the return of the 1975 generation of political exiles from their lusophone 
and antipodean diasporas, and the descent of the older Falintil commanders from the 
mountains, a new battle has been joined in East Timor. To borrow Daw Aung San Suu 
Kyi of Burma's telling phrase, the "new" generation in East Timor are now engaged in 
their "second struggle for independence," a struggle to secure a new democratic future 
for their country and ensure that the skills learned during the Indonesian period are 
validated in the post-independence era.42 As Bernardina Fernandes Alves put it to us:
We have to realize there are now two major influences on our country. One was,
of course, the 450-year legacy of the Portuguese. The other was the impact of the
Indonesian invaders. These two have profoundly shaped our culture and society.
. . . .  There are lots of good people who have been schooled under the
Indonesians. Well over a thousand graduated from universities in inner-island
41 See UNWire, "Most Serious Riots since Independence Hit Dili," December 4,2002; and Amnesty 
International, "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. A New Police Service—a New Beginning" 
(London: Amnesty International Secretariat, ASA 57/002/03), pp. 10-12.
42 Daw Suu was referring in her original remark to the Burmese anti-colonial struggle against the British in 
1908-42 and the present-day fight for democracy in military-ruled Burma which her party, the National 
League for Democracy (NLD), has spearheaded since its formation in September 1988.
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Indonesia alone during the occupation. Amongst these are many fine, educated, 
and capable people. We do not necessarily have to look to those who lived 
outside and studied in Portugal, Canada, Australia, or the UK. As for the Falintil 
commanders in the mountains, they also learned an enormous amount. These are 
the people we will have to draw on in terms of the leadership potential of our 
country. The younger generation, who grew up in the Indonesian period and 
mastered Bahasa, they will have a special function in guiding our country in terms 
of its future relations with Indonesia. Maybe we are going to be in for a big culture 
shock. So many of us have lived outside the country for so long, it's going to be 
really hard for us when we all get back together in East Timor. We must be 
prepared for the long haul. We must learn to work together and develop a lot of 
compassion, accommodation, and forgiveness for one another. (Interview with 
Bernardina Fernandes Alves, nom-de-guerre "Ohar," Lisbon, April 12, 1999)
Nowhere is this need for compassion, forgiveness, and accommodation more 
evident now than in the struggle over language, an issue which had much less salience 
during the occupation proper, when Bahasa appears to have been easily adopted as a 
lingua franca, at least amongst the Indonesian-educated urban elite.43
Why then is this the issue apparently fueling such tensions along generational lines? 
There is, of course, much more than language at stake here. Briefly put, however, the 
decision to adopt Portuguese as a national language, a decision taken at the CNRT 
(Conselho Nacional de Resistencia Timorense, National Council of Timorese 
Resistance) conference in Dili in August 2000 on the initiative of 1975-generation 
leaders such as Jose Ramos Horta and Xanana Gusmao, made members of the younger 
generation born and schooled during the occupation feel that their entire educational
43 The issue of language in present-day East Timor rquires a separate study in its own right. During the 
occupation, the Portuguese-educated, 1975 leadership generation continued to use Portuguese as their 
favored language of discourse, at least amongst fellow members of the elite (with non-elite Timorese, they 
spoke either in Tetum or in one of the regional languages). Some of those we interviewed, for example, Jose 
Augustinho Sequeira, nom-de-guerre Somotxo, (born 1960), a former bodyguard of Xanana Gusmao and 
later adjutant to both Falintil chief-of-staff Taur Matan Ruak (1990-94) and Commander Nino Konis 
Santana (1994-98), who joined the armed resistance in his native Lospalos in September 1976 at the age of 
sixteen when the Indonesians had yet to exercise full control over the region, never learnt Indonesian and 
continued to use Portuguese, Tetum, and his native Fataluku throughout the war. One of the reasons was 
that he remained fighting in the mountains for the entire occupation and never had occasion to study 
Bahasa. Interview with J ose Augustinho Sequeira (Somotxo), Lisbon, April 15, 2000. Those few who 
survived the war in the mountains were also ignorant of Bahasa, as were the Fretilin, UDT (Uniao 
Democratica Timorense, Timorese Democratic Union), and other political leaders who escaped into 
lusophone exile and sat out the occupation in Portugal or the former Portuguese colonies in Africa. 
However, the Catholic Church in Timor, the only quasi-independent institution in East Timor during the 
occupation, did deal directly with the language issue by refusing to adopt Bahasa as the language of the 
liturgy, when Portuguese was banned by Jakarta in 1981, and opting for Tetum instead. The Colegios 
(Church centers), where often the wives, children, and orphans of guerrilla fighters were looked after, also 
kept alive both the Portuguese language and lusophone traditions throughout the occupation. (The Colegios 
consisted of a parish church; a convent for priests, ordained religious, lay brothers, and nuns; a boarding 
school for boys and girls; and a large tract of land partly rented out to local farmers and partly cultivated 
by the boarders themselves to grow food for their school kitchens.) See Peter Carey, "The Catholic Church, 
Religious Revival and the Nationalist Movement in East Timor, 1975-98," Indonesia and the Malay World 
27,78 (1999): 83-6.
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experience under the Indonesians was being set at naught. Given the abysmal economic 
situation at the present time, a situation which is not likely to improve until 2004-5, 
when the first royalties (US$25-50 million a year) are received from the offshore LNG 
(Liquefied Natural Gas) fields in the Timor Gap in significant amounts, many well- 
qualified "new" generation East Timorese are now unemployed and have little 
prospect of getting white-collar jobs in the near future. Some sense that they could well 
become the equivalent of a "lost" generation. The older (pre-1975 generation) elite, who 
were educated in Portuguese-language schools or lived in exile in Portugal and the 
lusophone colonies in Africa (Angola, Mozambique, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Sao 
Tome e Principe), have succeeded to power in the new political order. The new 
"independence" generation, born in the mid- to late 1990s, and now entering primary 
school, will soon taste the fruits of a lusophone education. In contrast, the Indonesian- 
educated occupation generation feel that they are to some extent being ignored. Some 
fear that by the time the pre-1975 generation move on and the economy improves 
enough to secure them jobs, they will not be in a position to benefit from the new 
opportunities. Instead, they worry that they may be leap-frogged by the 
"independence" generation, who will have the language skills and educational 
advantages to command the top political and administrative posts in the new 
hydrocarbon-rich and OPEC-affiliated East Timor when they eventually graduate a 
decade hence. Existing tensions along generational lines have already spilled over into 
violence, as evidenced by the December 4, 2002 events detailed above.
Even at the highest levels of government there appear to be doubts about the 
wisdom of the language policy. This was vividly illustrated by a comment made by one 
of the few members of the occupation generation to secure a cabinet post in the new 
Fretilin-dominated administration, Arsenio Paixao Bano, Minister for Labor and 
Solidarity, who said that he was getting increasingly frustrated attending cabinet 
meetings conducted solely in Portuguese, when he alone amongst the cabinet ministers 
had little knowledge of that language. He wanted to express himself in Tetum (the 
lingua franca and second national language of East Timor) or Indonesian.44 The fact 
that some members of the 1975 generation elite—though not the current Prime Minister, 
Mari Alkatiri, whose family is of Yemeni Arab extraction and whose first childhood 
language was Malay—have no knowledge of Indonesian, and only a passive 
understanding of Tetum, is viewed negatively by the occupation generation, not to 
speak of the wider population, most of whom know some Bahasa but are almost 
wholly ignorant of Portuguese. It is significant that when Bishop Belo offered a literary 
prize for the best work by young Timorese poets and writers shortly before his 
resignation as Bishop on November 26, 2002 and subsequent departure for Portugal, a 
prize designed to encourage literary compositions in Tetum and Portuguese, most of 
the best work submitted in the poetry category was in Bahasa.45 While Belo took this in 
good spirit and immediately broadened the submission qualifications to include 
Indonesian compositions, most members of the older Portuguese-educated generation 
now in power may be less accommodating. The new Justice Minister, Ana Pessoa, for 
example, is insisting on the exclusive use of Portuguese in her department, and Jose 
Ramos Horta has gone on record dismissing Bahasa as "a language of donkeys,"
44 Interview with Arsenio Paixao Bano, Dili, September 10, 2002.
45 Interview with Antero Bendito da Silva, Co. Clare, Ireland, January 3, 2003.
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echoing the views of the Javanese prince, Pangeran Dipanagara (1785-1855), nearly 
two centuries earlier, who declared that "Malay is the language of chickens that no 
ruler in Java wishes to hear."46
In the international context, however, the choice of Portuguese is by no means as 
irrational as some of the younger generation critics make out. After the Indonesian 
invasion, the UN member states that actually helped East Timor when no one else 
would—apart from the former colonial power, Portugal, which did rather little in the 
1976-82 period—were the recently liberated Portuguese African colonies. 
Mozambique, for example, bankrolled Jose Ramos Horta as East Timor's unofficial 
representative at the United Nations General Assembly in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, and provided safe haven in Maputo for a number of Fretilin leaders, including 
Alkatiri. Even the right-wing regime in Portuguese-speaking Brazil offered support from 
time to time, especially in the late 1990s.47 So reliance on the lusophone world has 
proven its worth. Moreover, in terms of international reach, Portuguese is a far more 
internationally connected language than Indonesian.48 It remains the language of state in 
Portugal's former African colonies and in Brazil, where the 180 million-strong 
population has developed its lusophone inheritance in new and exciting ways. As for 
Tetum, many years of linguistic development will be necessary to bring it up to the level 
of an effective national language.
One other benefit of choosing Portuguese is that it would make any future 
subversion by Jakarta far more difficult by creating a linguistic line between East and 
West Timor that will be much sharper and easier to monitor. The only drawback at the 
moment appears to be the sheer cost of the Portuguese national language policy that 
will weigh heavily on the cash-strapped Timor Loro Sa'e government for years to come. 
For example, the bill for translating and publishing proceedings in the National 
Assembly and the criminal courts in four languages (Tetum, Indonesian, Portuguese, 
and English) is likely to top US$6 million, or nearly 10 percent of the total budget of 
US$65 million in fiscal 2002-3. There must also be a question about whether distant 
and economically straitened Portugal really has the political will to continue 
contributing the resources necessary to ensure the success of the current policy of 
lusophonization in East Timor over an extended ten to twenty-year period.
46 Jose Ramos Horta's remark was reported to me by Arnold Kohen, personal communication, August 8,
2003; and on Dipanagara's view, see Algemeen Rijksarchief (The Hague), Johannes van den Bosch Private 
Collection 391, J. H. Knoerle, "Aanteekeningen gehouden door den 2e Luit. J.H. Knoerle betreffende de 
dagelyksche verkeering van dien offider met den Prins van Djocjakarta gedurende eene reis van Batavia 
naar Menado, het exil van den genoemden Prins," Menado, June 20,1830, p. 41.
47 For a highly personal and idiosyncratic account of Horta's years at the UN, see Ramos-Horta, Funu, pp. 
97-158, 165-72.
48 Outside the 230-million strong population of Indonesia, Bahasa is only spoken in the tiny oil-rich 
sultanate of Brunei (340,000) and Malaysia (22 million). While in terms of total numbers of 
Indonesian/Malay speakers (over 250 million) this may seem impressive, the countries of the Community of 
Portuguese Speaking Countries (Communidade dos Pars da Lmgua Portuguesa, CPLP) outweigh Bahasa- 
speaking Southeast Asia linguistically (there are some 300 million Portuguese speakers worldwide), as well 
as diplomatically and economically. In Brazil's case, in terms of the size of its domestic economy reckoned in 
per capita GDP terms: in fiscal 2002-3 this amounted to US $500 billion, making it the ninth largest 
economy in the world, three times the size of Indonesia's (US$145 billion) and over twice that of 
Malaysia's (US$200 billion).
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If members of the "new" generation want to succeed to power during the coming 
decade, they must show a greater understanding of the political realities. Instead of 
rioting in downtown Dili, they should use the current electoral system to organize an 
effective, uncorrupt, and non-gangsterish electoral opposition to the Portuguese- 
educated generation who have come to power in the post-referendum period. After all, 
as Indonesian-language speakers, they belong to a far greater electoral majority than do 
the tiny lusophone elite. But they must make their case politically, rather than by 
violence. Moreover, if they want to secure a future for themselves in a Timor where 
Bahasa is still used, it is incumbent on them to produce a new generation of 
Indonesian-language speakers. If they fail here, not only will Timor be the poorer, but 
their fears of becoming a "lost" generation will be only too tragically fulfilled.
Erratum: The author notes that the name, Ejfdio, which recurs in the text, should be 
spelled Egfdio.

